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3It is almost a century since 
the full admission of women 
to the legal profession; almost 
90 years since the right to vote 
was granted to all women; 
almost half a century since 
the implementation of equal-
pay and anti-discrimination 
legislation, and today, female 
participation in the labour 
market is increasing rapidly. 
Yet for all the gains made, 
inequality between women 
and men persists and what has 
been achieved appears easily 
dismantled.
A recurring theme throughout out the LSE 
Commission on Gender, Inequality and Power is 
the decisive impact of the economic crisis of 2008 
on gender relations. Across the Commission’s 
four areas of focus: the economy, politics, law 
and media, the impact of that crisis and the 
austerity policies that followed was found to be 
considerable. Recovery from the great recession 
has been uneven and the costs of austerity 
have fallen disproportionately on women. 
Representations in the media and across popular 
culture have contributed to the normalisation of 
austerity politics, disguising the systematic impact 
on women and other groups. This environment 
has in turn adversely affected the law’s ability 
to redress urgent issues such as gender-
based violence and access to justice and legal 
enforcement. A legislature dominated by men 
has failed to adequately recognise the importance 
of gender audits when devising policy. 
All of which makes this report timely and 
necessary. The Commission’s work is distinct 
because it investigates links between different 
forms of gender inequality and the operation 
of gender-based power across four of the most 
important sectors of our society: the economy, 
the political sphere, the legal system and the 
world of media, culture and communications. 
The main focus of our report is gender inequality 
in these four spheres in the United Kingdom, 
but we draw upon comparative evidence where 
appropriate, and set our analysis within key 
aspects of international context and contrast. 
Intersecting inequalities: power, rights, 
violence and work-life balance
Bringing these ideas together matters to any 
discussion on gender and power. While our report is 
structured around four main sections corresponding 
to the economy, the political system, law and the 
media, intersecting themes run all the way through 
the report, producing an integrated analysis.
Our four areas of the economy, the political 
system, the legal system and the media are 
very far from exhausting the social spheres 
in which inequalities both persist and shape 
opportunities and status in other fields. To take 
just two obvious examples which we might have 
considered, inequalities in the education system 
have long-lasting effects in virtually every other 
sphere of life, while gender inequalities in the 
provision of health care seep into life chances and 
the quality of life across the spectrum of social 
life. Not every sector could be considered within 
the ambit of a single report; but we have further 
tried to capture the inter-relationships between 
inequalities of power in different social spheres 
by weaving through our sector-based analysis 
four cross-cutting themes: those of power, rights, 
work-life balance and gender-based violence.
Forces that shape persisting gender inequalities 
do not operate independently within different 
social sectors: rather, vectors of power affecting 
the position of women and men in one sector 
almost invariably affect their opportunities, 
status, position or the worth of their rights and 
entitlements in others. The gender  inequalities 
which persist in the labour market and the 
distribution of income, for example, privilege 
the already advantaged and curtail opportunities 
for women in the political sphere and within 
the law; the persisting inequalities and biases in 
the representation of women in the media and 
culture affect the opportunities of, and attitudes 
to, women in other spheres; the inadequate 
design or implementation of legal provisions 
shapes the status and opportunities of women in 
economic life. 
We have woven four crosscutting themes into 
our sector-based analysis: power, rights, quality of 
life arising from (un)healthy work-life balance and 
gender-based violence. 
Power and rights
The report explores the way in which vectors 
of power in the media, the economy and the 
political system shape the relative worth of 
rights formally established by the legal system to 
differently situated women and men. 
Work-life balance
Evidence gathered in all four areas revealed that 
the structure of gender relations – in particular, 
the unequal distribution of responsibility for 
the care of children and of the elderly – creates 
dilemmas of work-life balance which are 
detrimental to women’s quality of life, and to 
women’s life chances, across social spheres. 
Gender-based violence
While gender-based violence might be thought 
to be a concern primarily of the law, we seek 
to show the ways in which gender inequality 
in the political sphere dilutes the will to tackle 
gender-based violence or identify salient issues. 
Equally the ways in which media representations 
enact and normalise certain forms of gender-
based violence, with economic insecurity making 
women more vulnerable to violence. In particular, 
the government’s austerity policies have reduced 
funds for refuges for domestic violence survivors, 
despite analysis that shows how this violence 
generates significant costs to the economy in 
addition to the harm borne by women. 
INTRODUCTION
4Recognising the multiple  
dimensions of gender 
Our effort to set questions of gender inequality 
within the context of overlapping areas of social, 
political, professional and economic life constitutes 
one form of what social scientists have called 
intersectionality: in other words, the insight that 
social outcomes such as gendered inequalities are 
produced by multiple intersecting forces. 
Gendered outcomes are produced by interacting 
social causes and so, as well as power and gendered 
assumptions, the report considers the impact of 
ethnicity, wealth and educational and social status, 
migration status, sexuality, age, care responsibilities, 
and marital status. Gender is experienced within 
this multi-dimensional intersection of social 
positions, therefore it makes sense that gendered 
discrimination or disadvantage be examined within 
this broader context. 
Throughout our report, we draw attention to 
intersectionality, pointing for example to the 
differential impact of recent social, welfare 
and labour market policies on people  living in 
poverty, on those with caring responsibilities, on 
single mothers, and on people from certain ethnic 
minority groups. Other areas covered include the 
lower worth of legal protections against violence 
for those with insecure migration status and the 
differential impact of implicit biases in the media 
on older women and women from particular 
social groups. 
Within these areas of inquiry, overlapping themes 
and patterns emerged over the course of our 
discussions with experts – academics, activists, 
policy-makers and professionals: their evidence 
informs the report. In addition to the impact of 
the recession described above, experts presented 
significant evidence on the role of implicit 
assumptions in shaping and reinforcing gender 
inequalities. There is much work to be done, even 
in mainstream public and social life, to unearth and 
subject to critical scrutiny the gendered assumptions 
on which individual actions, regulatory norms and 
institutional designs still tend to be based.
Another key concern voiced in all four areas is the 
underuse of existing instruments – for example, 
gender auditing and quotas – to advance gender 
equality policy, strategy and action within existing 
institutional and legal arrangements. We develop 
these ideas in our recommendations. 
Evidence was presented in all four sessions 
of the detrimental impact of the increasing 
organisation of social and professional life around 
unconstrained commercial or market logics which 
undermine welfarist, collective or redistributive 
policy initiatives as contrary to the demands of 
efficiency. These ideas have helped to produce 
the disproportionate impact of austerity on 
women. Such trends have increased the degree 
of polarisation among women, potentially 
weakening the basis for pro-gender-equality 
political alliances. 
5Why focus on gender inequality and 
disadvantage? The reason is perfectly defined by 
the popular phrase “everyday sexism”: the idea 
that certain forms of gender discrimination are 
normal, even amusing. It indicates that, despite 
various forms of “progress” on discrimination, 
sexism is still both real and trivialised. This makes 
the job of arguing the case and fighting for 
gender equality more difficult. 
This report provides ammunition for those 
committed to change. In what follows, we 
lay the groundwork for a world of reduced 
gendered inequality, with a fairer gendered 
distribution of power and a fairer representation 
of women in public life.
Recommendations
Our recommendations are framed in recognition 
of the following:  
•   Many of the changes we propose require 
resources and the availability of these are 
dependent on political will. In turn, that 
political will is premised on the institutional and 
social factors considered in the Politics section, 
and also on government decisions regarding 
macroeconomic policy considered in the 
Economics section. The influence of the media 
and other cultural institutions considered in the 
Media section of this report also play a part.  
•   While our arguments are based primarily  
on the value of fairness and the aspiration  
to gender equality as a matter of social justice, 
we make the economic or business arguments 
for change where appropriate, and see no 
inconsistency in appealing to both kinds  
of consideration.
•   It is important to remember that legal, 
political, economic and media arrangements 
represent collective social choices, and that 
prevailing patterns of legally mandated or 
permitted inequality are not inevitable. Indeed 
in most cases, we are able to identify existing 
arrangements, or realistic proposals, which 
have real potential to effect improvements.
In light of these challenges, and of the vast 
range and complexity of social arrangements 
bearing on gender equality, there is no easy fix. 
As a consequence, we have a large number of 
interrelated recommendations that we have 
themed in parallel with the four sections of the 
full report. Some recommendations, including 
the need for quotas, targets and training, relate 
to all areas but take different forms when 
placed in context. Below is a summary of the 
recommendations discussed in each section of the 
report and informed by the Commission’s inquiries.
 
The Economy 
There are many challenges to tackle if we are 
to redress gendered imbalances in power that 
operate at different levels: from the management 
of the economy, to policies and practices within 
firms, organisations and communities, to personal 
relations within families and households. These 
challenges are complex and affected by the fact 
that real lives are shaped by the way that gender 
intersects with race, ethnicity and citizenship status. 
The following proposals and principles are critical. 
To obtain gender equality, social goals need to 
be targets of economic policy. Only in this way 
can the economy be made to serve society rather 
than vice versa. Current understandings of the 
economy need to be broadened to include the 
reproductive sector and unpaid care work. Ideas 
for a gender equitable, sustainable and caring 
economy have been outlined by the Women’s 
Budget Group in their Plan F briefing and there 
is growing evidence to suggest that such policies 
will generate higher levels of employment and 
economic growth. The purpose of the economy 
should be to support social well-being.
1.   Socially fair and gender sensitive 
macroeconomic policies   
To achieve greater gender equality, we 
recommend  a change in the direction of 
macroeconomic policy. Gender-sensitive 
macroeconomic policies are necessary for 
sustainable and inclusive development. 
Evidence shows that the current austerity policies 
have had a greater adverse impact on women, 
especially BME and low-income families, so we 
are not “all in this together”. The Government’s 
strategy to eliminate public debt contrasts with 
other western economies and conventional 
economic analysis. Alternatives are possible and 
likely to produce more inclusive outcomes, higher 
levels of employment and overall well-being.
Women on low incomes with caring needs and 
obligations need collectivised public services and 
social security payments to boost their incomes. 
Public expenditure is critical to prevent the loss 
of local services, including childcare centres, 
refuges for domestic violence survivors, and law 
centres to ensure access to the legal system for 
all. Moreover investing in social as well as physical 
infrastructure will bring future economic gains.
2.   Gender mainstream all  
government policies
We recommend that gender-responsive 
budgeting, gender auditing and impact 
analysis be introduced so as to identify the 
distributive impact of economic policy-
making. Gender budgeting identifies the 
gendered impact of policies and is technically 
possible, so it is incumbent on the government to 
ensure that this is done to the highest standards 
that are available. 
The government’s own impact assessments are 
cursory. This important task is therefore left to 
voluntary organisations such as the UK Women’s 
Budget Group, but these require funding. 
3.  Mandatory quotas 
We recommend that mandatory quotas 
be introduced to ensure greater gender 
balance in decision making positions and 
be accompanied by measures to ensure 
presence is sustained. Quotas backed by 
legislation are one of the most significant ways 
of effecting change; they are more effective than 
soft company initiatives and help ensure that 
society and firms reflect diverse ideas and talents. 
Existing legislation allows gender to be used 
as a tie-breaker in recruitment and promotions 
decision-making where merit is equal. 
Quotas represent a “minimal condition” for 
securing change. Presence alone is not sufficient, 
policies and practices cannot be presumed from 
gender identity. Gender-equitable policies need 
to be practised throughout an organisation to 
effect change, and support for senior women is 
necessary to prevent quotas from becoming a 
revolving door for women. 
4.   Gender awareness training for 
government employees 
We recommend that training in gender 
awareness be introduced so as to ensure 
effective gender mainstreaming. Within the 
private sector considerable attention is being 
given to the idea of unconscious bias but less 
to the gender composition of decision makers 
and the discretionary procedures that allow such 
bias to be effective. Evidence presented to the 
Commission shows that promotion and pay 
decisions should be based on formal, transparent 
criteria. Suitability for different jobs needs to 
be based on objective criteria and discretion 
minimised to avoid particular qualities being 
linked to gender stereotypes and existing patterns 
of bias. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
65.   Revalue work, identify and challenge 
unequal social norms 
We recommend that new methods of pay 
determination be introduced in order to 
better reflect the social value of work done as 
well as the costs of living. The gender pay gap is 
due to labour market segregation by occupation, 
status and working time. Evidence reviewed by 
the Commission suggests that pay is determined 
by social norms and by the power of people at the 
very top to determine their own pay. This power 
needs to be acknowledged and challenged.
6.  Create a National Care Service 
We recommend that a National Care 
Service be established to ensure that holistic 
affordable, accessible, appropriate care is 
available. It should ensure that the workers 
employed are rewarded appropriately for the 
complexity and skilled character of the work 
they do, given the high value that people 
place on human life and wellbeing.
Care provision is vital to individual and social 
well-being, and resolving the care question 
is fundamental to redressing and ultimately 
resolving gender inequality. Everybody requires 
care at some point in their lives and a majority 
of people provide care at some stage. Evidence 
presented to the Commission shows that good 
quality care creates positive social externalities 
or social gains in terms of more educated and 
rounded citizens. Similar to street lighting, it 
is a matter for public, collectivised support. 
Recognising the economic and social value of 
care work provides an economically rational 
argument for social investment in care. 
7.  Gender friendly working patterns
We recommend that government, institutions 
and firms organise their legislation, 
regulations and working patterns in ways that 
recognise people as caring citizens. Collectively 
society, industry and government must enact 
measures for an environment where people have 
time to care without adverse implications for 
job choices and career development. Measures 
should ensure that:
(1)   All jobs should be available on a 
part-time basis without adverse 
career impacts.
(2)   The long-hours culture and 
expectation of presenteeism 
should be eradicated and people 
leave work on time. 
(3)   Men as well as women should 
have time to care without 
penalties. Introduce individual, 
earmarked, non-transferable rights 
to paid leave. Such efforts need 
to be designed and implemented 
carefully. The direct provision of 
high-quality care services benefits 
everyone in much the same way, 
while policies which replace 
foregone earnings invariably 
distribute more resources towards 
the highly paid and so reinforce 
income inequality.
 
Politics
1.  Quotas
We recommend that political parties 
introduce or reintroduce minimum quotas for 
women for all internal positions. The use of 
gender quotas for internal positions ensures that 
men and women alike gain political experience 
and are able to contribute to policy formation. 
Though any kind of quota can, on occasion, 
be cumbersome or feel overly mechanical, the 
evidence suggests that this is the only way to 
ensure that questions of equality and diversity are 
taken seriously within a party. Quotas help make 
questions of inclusion and exclusion more visible, 
and widen awareness of the issues that need to 
be addressed in policy development. 
2.  Gender parity in government 
We recommend that political parties 
commit themselves to principles of gender 
parity (50/50) in the formation of future 
governments. This is an area where governments 
have the power to effect rapid change. There is 
no need to wait for the proportion of women 
in a parliament or assembly to reach 50 per 
cent before introducing parity in the selection 
of ministers; as several governments around the 
world have already established, this can be done 
as soon as there is the necessary political will. A 
requirement to appoint equal numbers of women 
and men helps challenge what is sometimes an 
inappropriate reliance on friendship networks and 
encourages more imaginative appointments.
3.   Achieving work-life balance in  
political work 
We recommend that Parliaments, Assemblies, 
and Councils be made more responsive to 
members’ family and care responsibilities, 
including through the implementation of 
parental leave in line with best public sector 
practice, and the revision of working hours 
and voting mechanisms. We have challenged 
the view that “supply-side” issues explain the 
under-representation of women, but this is not to 
understate the difficulties posed to anyone who 
has significant care responsibilities and yet wants 
to pursue a political career. Reforms already 
introduced in some of these bodies include on-
site nurseries, arranging sessions around school 
terms, allocating voting times in advance, and 
there is plenty of good practice to draw on here. 
Less has so far been done as regards parental 
leave arrangements, the overall length of the 
working day, or the possibility of job sharing 
for politicians. If we are to make our decision 
making assemblies more genuinely representative 
of the diversity of the electorate, we need more 
imaginative thinking about this. 
4.   Regulate political parties on  
gender equality
We recommend that parliament introduce 
a robust system of party regulation, with 
strong equality and diversity provision. Current 
regulation of political parties is almost entirely 
focused on sources of party funding and the 
conduct of election campaigns, but there is no 
reason why parties should not also be required 
to monitor their gender and ethnic composition, 
demonstrate that they have effective mechanisms 
in place to achieve a gender balance, and carry 
out gender audits of their policies. The Speaker’s 
Conference recommended that all parties 
should collect and publish data on their MPs, 
councillors, and candidates, broken down by 
gender, ethnicity, and disability, but so far this 
has been left to the parties to carry out on a 
voluntary basis. This means that some do – but 
not others. This kind of data collection should 
be a mandatory requirement, as important as 
collecting and publishing data on sources of 
party funding, and should be combined with a 
requirement to adopt and publish action plans 
setting out how they propose to diversify those 
elected as representatives of their party, including 
by gender. 
5.  Gender auditing 
We recommend that governments be 
required to carry out serious gender audits 
of all the policies they propose to introduce. 
Like everything in politics, gender audits provide 
no guarantee: they can easily degenerate into 
a “tick-box” approach, and when carried out 
by people who have no vested interest in their 
outcomes, often do so. That said, the key point 
about gender audits is that they require politicians 
and policy makers to address explicitly the likely 
impact of a policy on women and men, and to 
demonstrate that they have taken into account 
– and justified – whether the opportunities 
and burdens will be distributed differentially 
between the sexes. Given that so much of what 
sustains power inequalities are the unspoken 
assumptions, hidden principles, and taken-for-
granted parameters with which policy is currently 
7made, requiring our political representatives to 
think consciously about the gender impact of their 
initiatives opens up the space for what researchers 
call a “re-gendering” of politics and policy.
6.   Quotas for women selected to stand  
for Parliament 
We recommend that Parliament pass 
legislation establishing a ceiling gender 
quota for the MPs for each political party: a 
maximum 70 per cent of either sex at the first 
general election following the legislation, 
moving to a maximum 60 per cent of either 
sex at the following one, along the lines of 
the recent legislation in Ireland. This is the 
most controversial of our recommendations 
because it involves a mandatory quota on 
political parties in their selection of candidates 
for election. It is, however, increasingly the 
practice across Europe, including now in Ireland, 
and reflects frustration with the history of 
failed promises and insincere commitments by 
parties that do not yet regard the homogeneity 
of their representatives as a serious concern. 
Current improvements in gender balance are 
almost entirely due to those parties that have 
chosen, voluntarily, to act on this issue, but 
this leaves the gender imbalance in the other 
parties relatively untouched. Our framing of the 
recommendation as a ceiling rather than a floor 
reflects the strongly held views of contributors 
to the Commission that the burden of the 
argument should now shift from the under-
representation of women to the unjustifiable 
over-representation of men. 
Law
1.   Use equality legislation more effectively 
to improve representation 
We recommended that the scope for positive 
action within existing equality legislation 
be exploited more effectively to improve 
women’s representation in all fields of 
employment and political representation. 
In our view, the legal case for positive action 
has often been dismissed too quickly. In fact, 
there is considerable scope for working within 
the constraints set by the Equality Act’s basic 
anti-discrimination norm. There is an opportunity 
for using protected characteristics, such as sex, 
as tie-breakers in recruitment and promotions 
decision-making where merit is equal. 
The Act can also be used for equality-enhancing 
positive action outside the sphere of employment, 
for example in areas such as service provision. 
Moreover these possibilities might be reinforced 
by the full incorporation of the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women into English law, through 
reliance on the Article 4 provision for special 
measures to dismantle gender inequality. 
While quotas and targets are controversial, 
particularly in highly competitive fields, there 
are existing models on which we can build.  
One is the Labour Party’s successful experiment 
with all-women shortlists, formalised in the Sex 
Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002, 
as mentioned in our Politics section. We also 
welcome the recent adoption of targets for 
women on company boards and at partnership 
level in some law firms. We would argue that 
dialogue between government, unions, service 
users and professional bodies about the need 
to raise the targets from 30 per cent should be 
maintained. Targets are particularly important 
because of the impact of achieving a critical mass 
of women in any particular sector is likely to have 
further important knock-on effects. 
2.   Transparency and revised criteria of merit 
in recruitment 
We recommend that criteria of merit be 
subjected to careful re-evaluation across the 
labour market, so as to eliminate implicit 
gender bias and acknowledge the ways in 
which a diverse pool of experience within 
a workplace or area of service delivery 
constitutes one component of quality of 
service; and all employers should be under a 
legal duty to make their criteria of merit and 
promotion transparent. 
Our proposal here builds on detailed evidence 
presented to us by Dr. Laura Hilly in relation 
to one specific example: that of judicial 
appointments. This argued that the list of 
qualities and abilities used by the Judicial 
Appointments Commission (JAC) should be 
interpreted so as to acknowledge the importance 
of a breadth of experience to not merely the just 
representation of different groups but specifically 
the quality of justice and hence as an element 
of merit. For the evidence that experience 
shapes decision-making implies that a broadly 
constituted court has greater resources on 
which to draw in adjudicating with due regard 
to gender and other dimensions of equality 
before the law. Hence each appointment should 
be informed by the background experiences of 
the court as currently composed, with a view to 
expanding upon the experiential pool. In many 
instances, including the procedures of the JAC, 
this would not require new law or regulations, 
but rather an intelligent and critical reassessment 
of how existing criteria should be interpreted, 
along with further provision of mentoring and 
training for potential applicants. Consistent with 
this overall goal, the reframing of criteria of 
career progression through the judiciary should 
pay particular attention to encouraging the 
promotion of District and Circuit judges.
   
In case this proposal to review criteria of merit 
appears unrealistically radical, it is worth noting 
that we have a broad model on which to build. 
When the concept of equal pay for work of equal 
value was introduced in 1983, employers were 
8required to ensure that they could justify existing 
pay rates not merely by reference to traditional, 
highly gendered conceptions of the value of 
work, but in terms open to rational scrutiny. Our 
suggestion is that a similar approach needs to be 
applied to the concept of merit. Plentiful research 
evidence reveals the extent to which conventional 
conceptions of merit or worth are influenced by 
traditional gender assumptions. As in the case 
of job evaluation for the purposes of equal pay, 
this research should inform our reconsideration 
of prevailing notions of merit for the purposes of 
recruitment and promotion.
3.  Gender auditing
We recommend that all legislation be gender 
audited at the drafting stage, with a five-year 
review of any legislation with significant 
implications for gender equality. The scope of 
this auditing is of particular importance given 
that some of the legislation which has had the 
greatest positive impact on women’s lives – 
notably the Minimum Wage legislation (and 
now the New Living Wage) – is not ostensibly 
concerned with gender issues. Gender auditing 
should pay specific attention to streamlining the 
process of claiming/enforcement so as to facilitate 
access to justice. We have an existing model 
on which it is possible to build.  The recently 
created Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Women and Equalities, tasked with ensuring 
real accountability for the enforcement of legal 
equality norms, has the potential – if properly 
resourced and effectively led – to develop into a 
powerful, non-partisan political actor in the style 
of the influential Public Accounts Committee. 
4.   Mainstream gender assumptions within 
legal and university education
We recommend that the gender assumptions 
underlying law, the impact of law on gender 
equality, issues of the intersection between 
gender and other axes of differentiation and 
discrimination, notably ethnicity, and the 
provisions geared to addressing these issues 
in national law and international charters 
including the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights be mainstreamed in both university 
and professional legal education. The 
Feminist Judgments projects, among other 
resources, would provide a basis for raising 
awareness. The need to redress gender inequality 
and intersectional disadvantage should be 
incorporated in the professional training of, and 
codes of practice governing the conduct of, 
lawyers, judges and other professionals whose 
work bears on legal enforcement, notably the 
police, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Prison 
Service, the Probation Service, the Border Agency, 
and private companies running immigration 
detention facilities and prisons. 
Much of the evidence which we heard and the 
research carried out in preparing this report 
emphasised the degree to which progress in 
enhancing women’s legal status and ensuring that 
women’s legal rights are worth as much as those 
of men depends on the willingness to subject 
existing arrangements to critical scrutiny. To do 
this there must be adequate information about 
the impact of both those arrangements and the 
dynamics of power and psychology which feed 
into them. Key to this process of re-evaluation is a 
legal education which addresses issues of gender 
inequality and justice rather than attaching itself 
exclusively to an ideal of limited formal equality 
or of a gender neutrality impossible to achieve – 
and potentially damaging to seek – in a world in 
which the distribution of virtually all forms of social 
power is strongly gendered. 
5.   Strengthen the rights of women in custody 
We recommend that further emphasis be 
given to the realisation of the human rights 
of women in custody, both in immigration 
detention and in the criminal justice system, in 
light of recent evidence about poor conditions 
and abusive treatment. Successive reports 
over many years have drawn attention to the 
plight of women in the criminal justice system, 
where their relatively small numbers have led to 
special disadvantages – notably in terms of the 
likelihood of being imprisoned far from home, 
of being separated from children for whom they 
are primary carer, or of serving their sentence in a 
prison which is unsuitable or inadequate in terms 
of training, medical or mental health services. 
In particular, both sentencing decisions and the 
design of prison regimes should take into account 
the high proportion of women offenders who 
are themselves the victims of violence, trafficking, 
emotional abuse and other forms of gendered 
disadvantage. 
6.   Review legal aid cuts, abolish tribunal 
and judicial review fees 
We recommend that the recent cuts to legal 
aid be reviewed and, in large part, reversed, 
and that the imposition of fees for hearings 
at tribunals, and for judicial review, be 
abolished. This recommendation is informed 
by the importance of access to justice and 
by evidence showing that retrenchments 
in legal aid and moves towards greater 
deployment of alternative, informal means 
of dispute resolution may be particularly 
disadvantageous to women.
We further recommend that consideration be 
given to the potential to simplify formal court 
procedures so as to reduce the cost of, and 
maximise access within, the state justice system 
rather than simply concentrating on diverting 
cases to mechanisms of informal justice.
In recent years, a huge amount of reformist 
effort has gone into the construction of new 
forms of dispute resolution, including mediation, 
arbitration and restorative justice.  Arguably, 
however, there is unexploited scope for rethinking 
how court procedure and the structure of the 
legal profession may themselves be adding 
unnecessarily to the costs of enforcing legal 
rights, with adverse effects on access to justice.
7.   Fully incorporate CEDAW, ratify the 
Istanbul Convention 
We recommend that the capacity of the 
legal system to provide meaningful rights for 
women be bolstered not only by retention 
of the Human Rights Act, but also by the 
reinforcement of its strength in the field 
of equality by the full incorporation of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
and ratification of the Istanbul Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against 
women and domestic violence. In addition, 
we recommend that Section 14 of the Equality 
Act 2010, dealing with dual discrimination, be 
implemented so as to provide more effectively 
for the pursuit of discrimination claims based on 
disadvantages produced by intersecting protected 
characteristics.
Media and Culture
1.   Establish a standing committee, such as 
a national gender observatory, tasked 
with monitoring media production and 
the representation of gender, and with 
intervening in the public debate around 
such issues
We recommend that a standing committee 
tasked with quantitative and qualitative 
monitoring of women’s participation in media 
production be established. This committee 
could also respond to issues in relation to 
the representation of gender by providing a 
forum for the diversification of voices heard 
intervening in public debates around relevant 
issues. Interventions could, for example, take 
the form of responses to high profile incidents 
of violence against women such as the murder 
of Karen Buckley, and media framing of women 
with political power during moments such as the 
“Downing Street Catwalk”. These and related 
contexts would present opportunities for feminist 
9media scholars and activists to add to critical 
commentary. However, reactive critique is not 
enough, we would like to see a commitment to 
extended participation in the media at all levels 
by women from a variety of backgrounds.
2.   Foster critical media literacy  
skills throughout primary and  
secondary education 
We recommend that media literacy skills be 
fostered in the education system, for instance 
by including lessons on critical media analysis 
in the Personal Social Health and Economic 
Education (PSHE) curriculum. Education 
and training emerges as one key cluster of 
possible interventions to support positive shifts 
in the ways in which the media represents 
gender-related topics and their intersections 
with other in/exclusions and hierarchies in the 
longer term. The Commission sees potential, 
both in terms of children and young persons’ 
compulsory education, and professional training 
for journalists, editorial staff, and other media 
professionals.  Critical media literacy should be 
part of literacy education in schools.
3.   Include training on gendered 
representation, intersectionality and 
gender sensitive modes of communication 
We recommend that gendered 
representation, intersectionality and 
gender sensitive modes of communication 
be prioritised in professional training and 
qualifications for journalists and other 
media operatives. This includes critical media 
literacy, not only in terms of how to interpret 
the media but also in terms of how to educate 
journalists. The latter would be achievable if 
accrediting bodies were mandated to do so and 
annual auditing implemented, and there was 
additional investment in training and mentoring 
programmes to further women’s leadership in 
media organisations.
4.   Implement the recommendations made in 
the Leveson report
We recommend that the recommendations 
of the Leveson report be implemented, 
namely, by equipping the regulatory body with 
the power to act on third party complaints – 
such as complaints by representative women’s 
groups – and amending the Editors’ Code of 
Practice to reflect the interplay between freedom 
of expression/freedom of the press and existing 
equalities legislation.
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The task in overcoming the 
deeply-rooted processes that 
lead to gender inequality 
is huge. Despite nearly 50 
years of policy effort, gender 
inequality in the UK is far 
from eradicated. Many 
challenges remain if long-
standing commitments to 
gender equality are to be 
realised. In the labour market 
women are under-represented, 
underpaid and exploited, 
and so more likely than men 
to be poor. There is evidence 
of backsliding. On the World 
Economic Forum’s Global 
Gender Gap Index the UK has 
fallen from 13th position in 
2008 to 26th in 2014. 
This section of the 
Commission’s report will 
focus on gender inequalities 
in the economy. First, it 
looks at current patterns 
of gender inequality, their 
underlying processes, how 
unequal outcomes are 
formed and explains why this 
matters, not just for women, 
but for everyone. In the 
“Ways forward” section, it 
considers possible remedies. 
Finally, we conclude with 
recommendations for policy.1  
Where possible the report 
documents that the way 
in which women and men 
experience the economy are 
diverse and modified by other 
key markers of social identity, 
especially social class, race 
and ethnicity. Other important 
markers such as sexuality 
have been given less attention 
primarily because comparable 
data is not available, an 
absence which needs to be 
addressed. 
THE ECONOMY
11
Current patterns of  
gender inequality 
Women at work
Compared to the EU average, the UK has a 
high employment participation rate but above-
average gender pay and pensions gaps.2 The 
gender employment rate gap has narrowed 
from 39 per cent in 1971 to just 10 per cent 
in 2014 meaning that 68 per cent of women 
compared to 78 per cent of men are now in 
employment (see Figure 1). However the pace of 
change has stalled since the 1990s and current 
trends suggest it is unlikely that the gap will 
close in the next decade.3  
The trend is the same  for all ethnic groups, 
though the employment rate of BME (Black and 
Minority Ethnic) groups is generally lower than 
Whites: for men by 10 per cent and women by 
16 per cent. The size of the gender gap varies 
between ethnic groups, however. Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani groups have the widest gap with 
just 31 per cent of women in employment 
compared to 67 per cent for men. Even so 
there has been a doubling of employment of 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani women in the last  
20 years.5
Increase in working mums,  
especially lone parents
One reason why the gender employment 
rate gap has narrowed is because mothers 
of young children are much more likely to be 
in employment than they were two decades 
ago (65 per cent of those with children aged 
four in 2014 compared to just 47 per cent in 
1996).6 This shift is due to: women’s increasing 
educational qualifications and wish to practise 
their skills, and the increasing need and desire to 
contribute to household income which reflects 
the decline in the real value of male median 
incomes.7  Other reasons include: the changing 
structure of the economy, from manufacturing 
and heavy industry towards services; the increase 
in the state pension age; greater relationship 
instability; changes in family structure; and  
new styles of living, especially single  
person households. 
In addition, from the late 1990s successive 
government policies encouraged people to move 
from social security to paid work. Lone mothers 
in particular were targeted for employment 
activation policies. Their employment rates 
increased as a consequence,8 but remain lower 
than partnered parents, especially when children 
are young (see Figures 2 and 3).9 Moreover, lone 
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
20
13
20
10
20
07
20
04
20
01
19
98
19
95
19
92
19
89
19
86
19
83
19
80
19
77
19
74
19
71
Women
Men
Employment
Rate (%)
Aged 16-64
Figure 1 Employment Rate: Narrowing Gender Gap (1971-2014)4 
Note: Employment Rate for the working populations is defined as the percentage of women and 
men in employment aged 16-64 years in work. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
201420101996
In paid work
Not in paid work
Figure 2 Lone parents with dependent children in paid work (%)10 
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parents  are more likely to be engaged in lower 
paid and precarious work (see Table 1).
The increase has been fairly steady with some 
marked increases between the years identified 
to reflect changing legislation and increasing 
compulsion. 
Among mothers, participation varies not 
only by partnership status and the age of the 
youngest child but also by ethnicity, educational 
qualifications and social class, with participation 
being higher among the ethnic white majority 
and the more highly qualified. Despite 
these many variations, fundamental gender 
inequalities remain within the labour market 
relating to hours worked, job opportunities and 
levels of pay. These are discussed further below.
Gender differences in hours worked 
Being in paid work matters for a number of 
reasons. It brings earnings, an opportunity 
to utilise skills and provides a means of 
socialisation. However, parity of employment 
rates alone will not resolve gender inequality. 
While a smaller proportion of men are in paid 
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employment than ever before, they work 
more hours than women (especially fathers of 
young children, see Figure 3), and perhaps, as a 
consequence, are over-represented in positions of 
power and responsibility and under-represented 
among precarious, temporary and low paid 
workers (Tables 1 and 2). When women are asked 
why they are working part time, the most frequent 
reply is to “accommodate family responsibilities” 
and is therefore assumed to be a choice that 
reflects individual preferences. This interpretation 
overlooks   the way that choices are made in a 
context of opportunities and constraints. In the 
UK, for example, high-quality affordable and 
available child care is lacking.12 If available, choices 
are likely to be different. The same applies in 
employment where certain groups are forced 
into particular sectors. Social care in particular is 
characterised by a high migrant density and so too 
is childcare in the informal sector.13 
The lack of collective responsibility for caring, 
combined with the uneven gender division 
of labour, constrains women’s employment 
possibilities, and helps explain why women are over 
represented in part time, flexible and temporary 
work, including zero hours contracts, (see Table 
1.14) Only a small proportion of workers overall 
are on these contracts, but 60 per cent of home 
care workers are on zero hours, and this is one 
of the fastest growing and most feminised areas 
of employment.15 Zero hours contracts reduce 
employment rights and effectively eliminate a 
worker’s power to complain because, “It is simply 
too easy to cut someone’s hours.”16 The rights of 
people receiving care (the majority of whom are 
older women) to be treated with decency, dignity 
and respect are also adversely affected.17  
A highly flexible UK labour market enables 
employers to save costs by adjusting the 
workforce according to their needs, but this 
impacts negatively on employees. It limits career 
development, creates financial uncertainty, even 
though the majority of those on zero hours 
regularly work 20 hours a week, and has a 
negative impact on lifetime earnings and pensions. 
This is reflected in the UK’s above average gender 
gap in pension entitlements compared to the EU18  
and places women (especially BME women) at 
greater risk of poverty than men.19 
Table 1 Gender differences in part time and 
flexible work (2014)20*
women Men
% of 
women
As % 
of total
% of 
men
As % 
of total
Full time 
work
57.4 36.7 86.8 63.2
Part time 
work
42.5 73.9 13.6 26.0
Temporary 
contracts
6.9 52.9 6.0 47.0
Zero Hours 2.7 55 1.9 45 
Self-
employed**
9.84 31.2 19.01 68.8
Low paid 
workers
1.1 53.0 1.0 46.9
Earnings 
below living 
wage***
25 62 10 38
*Low paid workers – those paid less than the national 
minimum wage.21
**The percentage of women and men who are 
self-employed is expressed as a % of all those in 
employment.22
*** Those earning below the living wage –  
data is for 201123
Flexible work takes many forms: it can be 
employer led or employee chosen and, as a 
consequence, outcomes vary.24 Here our focus 
is on parents who seek flexible hours. Since 30 
June 2014, all full-time employees with at least 
26 weeks of service have the right to request 
flexible working. However, the right to request 
flexible working does not mean that it will 
necessarily be granted. Furthermore, anyone 
taking this route risks falling off the career track 
because they (especially fathers) are perceived 
to be less committed workers and once granted 
there is no right to return to full-time work.25 This 
approach contrasts markedly with Norway where 
a proportion of leave is reserved for fathers on 
a “use it or lose it” basis. As a consequence, it 
has become normal for fathers to take leave: 90 
per cent “use it” compared to only 4 per cent in 
1993 when the quota was introduced.26  
Regardless of whether women choose to 
request flexible hours or not, the fact that they 
are more likely than men to do so can enter 
into the perceptions of the predominantly male 
decision-makers in a negative way. As discussed 
during the Commission’s sessions on both Law 
and Politics, it can form part of the “outgroup 
homogenising” and “implicit stereotyping” 
aspects of the unconscious bias of decision 
makers that impedes the career progression of 
those who do not fit the prevailing images of 
leadership, power and public responsibility.27 
These gendered assumptions about suitability 
for different kinds of employment feed into the 
gendering of occupations along stereotypical lines 
resulting in horizontal and vertical segregation.
Pregnant women at work
Despite protective legislation, pregnant women 
experience discrimination from employers. 
Women report being side-lined by employers 
once they have announced their pregnancy and, 
contrary to employment rights, are demoted 
when returning to work.28 Overall, during the 
recession the number of cases taken to tribunals 
increased by a fifth, but since 2013, when 
fees were introduced, the number of cases has 
fallen indicating how the government’s austerity 
policies are prejudicing commitments made 
under the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.29  
Gender inequality by occupation
In the UK, the decision to work part-time often 
requires a change of job and an occupational 
downgrade. As a consequence, more women 
Note: The figure for fathers does not vary by the age of the youngest child.
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than men are over-qualified for the work they 
do, so sustaining gender inequality as well as 
losing talent from the economy.30  As Figure 
4 shows, men are still over-represented in 
high-paid jobs and in positions of power and 
responsibility across all sectors. As wages rise, 
the proportion of men increases.
Among the lower paid are women, concentrated 
in the 3Cs (Caring, Clerking and Cashiering), 
while men are associated with machines and 
“Skilled Trade Occupations” which are paid 
more. Both groups earn considerably less than 
managers, directors and senior officers, also 
predominantly male, showing how gender and 
social position intersect. What is clear is that 
men dominate positions of power (see Table 2 
which depicts the gender composition of top 
management in the FTSE 100 companies).32  The 
gender balance deteriorates with increasing rank 
as the proportion of White men increases.33
The proportion of women in senior positions has 
increased following equalities legislation in the 
UK in 2007 and 2010.35 Rather than following 
Norway,36 which passed legislation to ensure 40 
per cent women’s representation on the board, 
the UK has relied on voluntary measures. In 2015, 
97 per cent of the top 100 FTSE organisations 
have male “chairmen” and  95 per cent of 
Chief Executives and 92.4 per cent of Executive 
Directors are men. Overall two out of three FTSE 
organisations have entirely white Boards.37 
Gender Inequality in Pay
Gender imbalances in the occupational hierarchy 
and between occupations are reflected by the 
gender pay gap. It is important to recognise that 
this indicator can be measured in different ways, at 
different levels (national, regional or enterprise), for 
different social groups (parents and non-parents, 
young and old, BME) at different points in the pay 
hierarchy and so on. So when making claims about 
the gender pay gap or policies for its resolution, 
it is critical to pay attention to the measure being 
used. The most common measure is the full time 
median hourly pay for those aged between 16  
and 64 at the national level as it provides the 
closest comparison in terms of payment for  
work provided.
On this measure, the gender pay gap for 
full time workers has fallen from 17.4 per 
cent in 1997 to 10 per cent in 2013, but 
this misrepresents the scale of inequality as 
women make up only 36.7 per cent of full-time 
workers (see Table 1). Taking full and part-time 
employment together, the gender pay gap 
rises to 19.1 per cent in 2014; the UK has the 
Table 2 Women at the top: representation in the FTSE 10034
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2010/11                2015 Change 2010-
2015
Representation of men on FTSE 
100 boards 
87.5% 76.5% -11 (percentage 
points)
Number of companies with 
25%+ representation of women
12 49 +29
Total number of women on FTSE 
100 boards
135 263 +128
Number of women Non-
Executive Directors
117 (15.6%) 239 
(28.5%)
+122
Number of men Executive 
Directors
82 (94.5%) 76 (92.4%) -6
Number of men Chairmen 98 97 -1%
Number of men Chief Executives 95 (5%) 95 (5%) unchanged
Number of all-male boards 21 0 -21
Number of men appointments in 
the year
117 (out of 
135)
112 (out of 
164)
-34
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sixth highest gender pay gap in the European 
Union.38 There has been little change in the 
gap in higher paid jobs (see Figure 5), in fact 
one reason the gap has narrowed is because of 
the decline in male earnings at the bottom.39  
For part-time workers, the gender pay gap is 
significantly higher when compared to full-time 
men.40 At the current rate of change, it will take 
30 to 50 years to eliminate the gender wage 
gap for full-time workers and 300 years for 
female part-timers.41 
In addition to occupation, the gender pay 
gap also varies according to age, marital and 
parental status, age of children and whether 
people work in the public or private sectors, 
Figure 6 Wage distribution for full and part-time workers (hourly earnings £ per hour) 201443 
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being lower in the former and by contract 
(see Figure 6). There is also a pay gap by 
ethnicity to the advantage of White men, 
linked to occupation, qualifications as well as 
discrimination, but this data is less frequently 
reported especially when gender and ethnicity 
are examined together.45 
Figure 7 shows that the gender pay gap for 
parents widens especially from the age of 30, 
illustrating the persistence of a motherhood pay 
penalty.46 When contrasted with a similar graph 
for single men and women without children, 
there is a still a gender pay gap but initially it 
is to the advantage of women. From the age 
of 40 the pattern reverses, the gap widens, 
though remains lower than for parents, but, 
similarly, it reflects men’s dominance in top jobs 
and in the higher-paying sectors and shows 
that motherhood is not the only obstacle to 
gender equality. The motherhood penalty varies 
over the life course, with respect to numbers of 
children, educational qualifications and between 
countries, suggesting that it can be moderated 
by labour market, childcare and social security 
policies.47 The motherhood penalty in the UK 
is greater than in the Nordic countries and is 
linked to the difficulty of combining work and 
care where accessible, affordable, available 
and appropriate childcare is lacking.48 Mothers 
often move from full to part-time work, or 
switch occupations and chose jobs on the 
basis of their hours and location rather than 
their qualifications and experiences, so they 
can be under-employed in two senses, first 
because they may be working fewer hours 
than they would wish (which has doubled 
since the recession)49 and second because they 
are working below their potential (given their 
qualifications) and their skills and talents are lost 
to society.50  
David Cameron wants to “end the gender 
pay gap in a generation”.52 The Commission 
welcomes this ambition, but to date the policy 
rests on naming and shaming companies, by 
requiring those with over 250 employees to 
disclose their average gender gap for “people 
with roughly the same job and title.”53 While 
transparency in pay is important, measuring 
inequality within firms for similar jobs is a limited 
interpretation of the gender pay gap. Indeed, 
the CBI oppose the policy and the Adam Smith 
Institute said it was a “sad state of affairs when 
even the prime minister is promoting the gender 
pay gap myth.”54  
The government also intends to introduce 
gender pay audits and a campaign to persuade 
girls to study mathematics and the sciences. The 
regulations will be informed by a consultation 
exercise so it is not possible yet to predict how 
effective the policy will be. There is always 
the risk that such reporting can give rise to a 
benchmarking standard where having a similar 
gap to other firms, rather than eliminating the 
gap, represents a satisfactory position, rather as 
the 25 per cent level for women’s representation 
on the Board.
A further problem arises because measurement 
at firm level will not reflect women’s  over 
representation in low-wage sectors, for example 
social care: one of the most feminised and rapidly 
expanding sectors of employment, characterised 
Figure 7 Pay gap between Mothers and Fathers (a) and between Singles without children (b)51 
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by low remuneration and zero hour contracts. In 
addition, the hourly pay measure disguises the 
way that other gendered constraints mean that on 
average women do less paid work than men and 
so when measured on a weekly or annual basis the 
gender pay gap is far wider and this impacts on 
gender differences in overall income and pension 
entitlements, reflected in the gender poverty gap. 
Consequently, the New Living Wage (NLW) to 
be introduced in April 2016 will not resolve the 
gender income gap even though two thirds of 
the beneficiaries are expected to be women. The 
effects of the NLW are also predicted to be more 
than offset by more cuts in social security.55 
Unemployment, under-employment and 
economic inactivity
Employment matters as it is the primary means 
by which the majority of the population acquires 
income. It also provides a means of socialisation, 
self-expression and being able to contribute to 
society visibly: hence the focus of this section of 
the report. Unemployment, under-employment 
and economic inactivity provides the mirror 
image of employment but unemployment 
statistics are complicated by their interrelation 
with benefits criteria, something not addressed in 
this report. Women who are without paid work 
with employed male partners are more likely to 
register as “economically inactive” rather than 
unemployed as they may not be entitled to any 
benefit claim. Overall, women are over-represented 
amongst those defined as “economically inactive” 
(62 per cent of the overall total) but not in terms 
of unemployment (45 per cent of the total).56 In 
addition, economic inactivity is higher among BME 
groups, and among young people.57  
Table 3 Changes in the reasons for Economic inactivity (%) 1993-201561 
One aspect of unemployment which is often 
overlooked is the way that young women are 
overrepresented among the NEETS – those Not 
in Employment, Education or Training. While the 
image is often portrayed as disaffected young 
men, in fact 93,000 more women than men 
are NEET.58 Young women with children face 
particular problems in finding employment that 
pays a sufficient wage to cover their travel (and 
time) and childcare costs, in part because of the 
low pay associated with the jobs that young 
women are more likely to do.
Nonetheless, economic inactivity has declined 
and the rationale has changed over the last two 
decades as a consequence of both changing 
lifestyles but also increased social and political 
compulsion to be in paid work. Even so, by 
far the main reason women give for economic 
inactivity is “looking after home and family” (see 
Table 3). While increasing, only a small proportion 
of men give this reason, reflecting the continuing 
gender asymmetry in gender roles which, 
together with the pay gap, accounts in part for 
women’s over representation in poverty.59 
In the last three decades, fertility rates have 
remained moderately high and the pace of 
population ageing in the UK has been slow 
relative to much of Europe. However, the costs of 
bearing and raising the next generation have been 
disproportionately carried by women with the 
least to lose in terms of the motherhood penalty: 
those with the lowest resources and located in the 
most precarious and poorly paid segments of the 
labour market, exacerbating income inequality and 
contributing to the relatively high child-poverty 
rates observed in the UK.60 
Gender, income and poverty
The gender gap in individual income (which 
reflects the money available to people after 
earnings, dividends from wealth holdings, 
benefit payments and taxes have been taken 
into consideration) is even wider than the 
gender pay gap because fewer men withdraw 
from paid employment to accommodate caring 
responsibilities.62    
The extent of gender difference varies between 
ethnic groups, as does the proportion of women 
living in poverty – which in all cases is higher 
than for White men but to varying degrees. 
Fewer White British men (14.1 per cent) than 
White British women (16.7 per cent) live in 
poverty, and the gap is wider for all other 
ethnic minority groups. Close to 50 per cent of 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani women live in poverty 
(see Table 4).63   
Table 4 Gender Income and Poverty Gaps64 
Gender Income 
Gap (%)
(compared to 
white men)
Poverty Rate 
of Women
(white British 
men 14.1%)
Chinese 24.9 20.6
Black  
Caribbean
24.9 23.5
Black  
African
27 22.7
White  
British
36.9 16.7
Indian 43.8 23
Bangladeshi 62 51.9
Pakistani 63 46
The gendered processes underlying the gender 
pay gap contribute to increasing poverty among 
lone parents and single elderly women as they 
are dependent on their own, typically lower, 
incomes.65 Women make up 65 per cent of 
pensioners living at risk of poverty, ie, having 
less than 60 per cent of median income.66 Lone 
parents, who are disproportionately female (92 
per cent), also face a high risk of poverty (43 per 
cent). Having declined every year since 1996/7, 
this has increased with the austerity policies 
introduced in 2010 and been intensified by the 
“welfare” reforms.67   
Impact of the Recession and Austerity
The UK is emerging slowly from the deepest 
recession ever recorded. After an initial period 
of fiscal expansion in 2008, the Coalition 
government elected in 2010 changed course 
and embarked on austerity policies in attempt 
to reduce the public sector deficit. Economic 
Women Men
Women as 
% of total
1993 2015 1993 2015
Looking after home and family 48.3 36.3 4.5 6.8 90
Students 11.8 20.0 28.5 35.8 48
Long-term sick 14.2 18.1 38.3 29.5 50.4
Retired 11.7 14.4 13.3 14.1 62
Total* 86 88.8 84.6 86.2 62
* the rest of the total is made up of temporary sick, discouraged workers and “others” – each 
category is less than 10 per cent and the gender gap in each is low.
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and employment growth have resumed, but 
the recovery has been uneven and the costs 
of austerity have fallen disproportionately on 
women, ethnic minorities and people on low 
incomes. Analyses carried out by the House of 
Commons library and the UK Women’s Budget 
Group show that 78.9 per cent of the cuts in 
welfare have68 fallen on and will continue to fall 
on women, especially lone parents. Similarly, the 
Runnymede Trust has found the latest Budget 
(June 2015) “welfare” reforms – cuts to tax 
credits and the benefits cap on households with 
three or more children – will disproportionately 
affect BME people.69    
Women account for 65 per cent of public sector 
employment where wage increases will be frozen 
at 1per cent a year for the next four years. Low-
paid workers will also experience social security 
cuts, so the drop in real income will be greater.70 
In addition women are more likely than men to 
be users of public services, and more likely to 
claim social security owing to their lower lifetime’s 
earnings and lower pay – described by the 
Fawcett Society as the triple jeopardy.71  
Not only do austerity policies impact negatively 
on women’s well-being, they can also increase 
government spending and so fail to achieve their 
intended effect. Evidence to the Commission  
shows that the costs of responding to domestic 
violence are £23 billion a year for the UK, 
consisting of costs to public services, the criminal 
justice system, civil and legal services, health care, 
social services and children, housing and refuges, 
and lost economic output.72 Thus, by cutting back 
on preventative measures overall, costs may rise. 
This argument for retaining preventative services 
is clearly instrumental, but nonetheless used by 
NGOs to support their case for maintaining these 
services and their existing specialised forms, which 
are particularly important for BME groups.73 
These outcomes reflect the failure by 
government to recognise, understand or 
respond to the gendered processes in the 
family, the economy and in neoliberal economic 
thinking that exacerbate gendered vulnerabilities 
and inequalities. The continued pursuit of 
austerity reflects a particular understanding of 
the economy which prioritises the market and 
the interests of creditors over and above those 
of the majority of the population.74 
Whilst countries cannot run up government 
deficits and debt indefinitely there is no clear 
consensus as to what a maximum should be. 
The maximum would depend in part on what 
the debt was being used for – more specifically, 
whether it was generating returns in the future or 
whether it was being dissipated in unproductive 
ways. Moreover, there is no one way to reduce 
the public deficit. Paying down the public deficit 
could come from taxation, especially considering 
that 10per cent of households in Britain are very 
close to being millionaires. Indeed, high levels of 
personal wealth mean that the UK overall is not in 
deficit. Instead, there is a problem of distribution 
between public and private sectors, which has 
become more uneven since the 1980s; a shift in 
distribution that has coincided with a significant 
fall in the taxation on top incomes. 
This is a case where the presence of women may 
bring about change. Macroeconomic policies 
are generally assumed to be gender neutral 
but existing understandings of the economy 
are very much shaped by male life experiences. 
Emphasis is placed on the production of goods 
for the market and the contribution of the 
goods and services produced in the home, 
critical to human well-being, is neglected and 
undervalued. This bias is clearly evident in the 
differential treatment of expenditure on physical 
infrastructure which is considered investment 
and comes from the capital account (building 
roads, airports and railways including the wages 
of the workers), and expenditure on social 
infrastructure (provision for childcare, elderly 
care) which is considered as consumption and 
comes from the current account. Under current 
Treasury rules governments are allowed to 
go into debt to fund investment but not to 
fund consumption. Yet, expenditure on social 
infrastructure makes life itself possible and 
contributes to the skills and talents of the next 
generation and so is critical to economic and 
social wellbeing. In addition, as an effective 
countercyclical strategy expenditure on social 
infrastructure has been shown to have a higher 
multiplier effect, ie, a more positive effect 
on economic and employment growth, than 
physical infrastructure.75  
Ways forward 
To properly reward and value the contributions 
of both women and men to the economy, 
there must be a solution for the unequal and 
gendered distribution of paid and unpaid 
labour. Equality legislation and company policies 
are essential but need to be supported and 
reinforced as part of a constellation of measures 
at the macro and micro levels. These should 
include supportive macroeconomic policies, 
gender analysis and auditing of macroeconomic 
policy, greater state support for child and elder 
care, properly paid paternity and maternity 
leave,76 quotas, pay audits, and continual 
monitoring. The Commission has identified three 
key areas for change: the macro context, work-
life balance and inequality within work.  
Macro level context
Since 2010, the government’s macroeconomic 
policy has aimed to eliminate the deficit 
and reduce the size of the state’s debt. This 
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contractionary strategy was promoted as 
the only way to restore economic growth 
and stability. Comparing the economy to a 
household that has “maxed out its credit card” 
has been particularly persuasive in gaining 
widespread acceptance for austerity policies 
by all mainstream political parties and the 
electorate, despite the erroneous analogy with 
the national economy and irrespective of the 
adverse impacts for women, people on low 
incomes and BME groups.77 More broadly, as 
noted in the media and culture section of the 
Commission’s inquiry, the idea that individuals 
are alone responsible for their wealth and 
success, ignoring the implication of structural 
inequalities, has been parroted by the media and 
reinforced in popular culture. 
To achieve greater gender equality and 
sustainable development a shift away from 
these ideas is required and gender-sensitive 
macroeconomic policies need to be introduced.  
A detailed analysis of government expenditure 
since 2010 found that austerity in the formal 
sense of fiscal consolidation, ie, the government 
spending less than it was taking in taxation, 
took place only in the first two years of office 
2010 and 2011.78 Subsequently between 2012 
and 2014 the budget has been neutral or 
mildly expansionary, and only in those years did 
growth return. Even so, successive budgets have 
had significant, highly gendered distributional 
implications. Importantly, cuts in government 
expenditure and social security continued but 
were matched by tax reductions.  Some of these 
measures, such as increases in the personal 
tax allowance, tend to benefit men and higher 
wage earners to a greater extent than women. 
This is partly because women are more likely 
to be on incomes too low to pay tax and more 
likely to be social security claimants and, as 
previously mentioned, benefit from the provision 
of collectivised services affected by the cuts in 
public expenditure.79 Government policy has 
effectively redistributed resources from women 
to men. 
The Fawcett Society sought to judicially 
challenge the gendered implications of these 
policies in 2010 after the government’s first 
austerity budget, but the case failed. In 
subsequent budgets, the government has 
produced brief gender impact statements, but 
these are flawed and superficial. The Prime 
Minister told the CBI in 2012:  
“I care about making sure we treat 
people equally. But let’s have the 
courage to say it, caring about these 
things does not have to mean churning 
out reams of bureaucratic nonsense. 
We have smart people in Whitehall who 
consider equalities issues while they’re 
making the policy. We don’t need all 
this extra tick-box stuff. So I can tell you 
today we are calling time on Equality 
Impact Assessments. You no longer have 
to do them if these issues have been 
properly considered. That way policy-
makers are free to use their judgement 
and do the right thing to meet the 
equalities duty rather than wasting their 
own time and taxpayers’ money.”80 
This hands-off approach is disturbing because 
it ignores the serious problem of gender 
bias. There is plenty of evidence showing the 
gendered impact of the government’s budgets, 
documented in House of Commons Library 
research and in reports from the UK Women’s 
Budget Group. But this work alone is not 
enough, the government must employ proper 
gender auditing methods and qualified staff 
to undertake regular analysis. The House of 
Commons research is the result of an ad hoc 
request for information by an MP81 and the 
WBG work is the result of unpaid time and 
diligence of voluntary analysts. Further, securing 
gender equality needs more than civil servants 
who simply “consider equalities issues while 
they’re making the policy”. 
Work-life balance
There is now greater symmetry between women’s 
and men’s lives. This convergence, however, 
has been principally one sided: women have 
been assimilated into a largely unmodified, 
masculinised model of paid employment to a 
greater extent than men have been assimilated 
into a feminised world of domestic work and 
care. The upshot is a caring deficit that is resolved 
in different ways depending on the form of care, 
the social positioning of the user and the wider 
economic, social and cultural context. 
While nearly everyone gives and receives care 
at some stage over their life, universally across 
the globe women do the majority of caring and 
domestic work. This matters because it reduces 
the time women have available for paid work, 
contributes to enduring disadvantages in the 
labour market and reduces their earnings. As 
a consequence, women are often perceived to 
contribute less to their families and have less 
independence within the household, and this 
reinforces unequal power relations between 
women and men more generally.
Caring work
Care work is relational, requires direct human 
encounters and is therefore inherently highly 
labour intensive. Productivity increases could 
only take place if the character of the work is 
profoundly changed. Expecting childminders 
to look after six rather than four children 
simultaneously, (as proposed by Liz Truss, at the 
time Parliamentary Undersecretary for Education 
in the coalition government) would change the 
nature of the work by reducing the care each child 
can receive. To demonstrate this point Zoe Williams 
published a photograph of herself with six toddlers 
commenting: “This is – no offence – the worst 
idea a person in government has ever had.”82 The 
proposal was withdrawn subsequently.83 
These characteristics also apply to social care 
for the elderly and infirm and mean that in 
18
both cases the costs of care relative to other 
goods will rise over time.84 As a consequence 
it becomes difficult for the private sector to 
provide care profitably unless they employ 
people on low wages, receive state subsidies 
or increase the intensity of work so risking its 
quality. Workers are expected to do specific 
tasks in ever diminishing time slots leaving 
little time to speak to their clients or care in 
any meaningful way. In addition, many are 
underpaid as employers often pay only for the 
time spent in the clients’ houses and not the 
travel time in between. The National Audit 
Office found that 220,000 workers were  
being paid less than the minimum wage  
as a consequence.85 
 
Balancing work and care
In the last five years, childcare costs have risen 
by nearly 33 per cent, with the average cost 
of a nursery place rising to £6,000 per year 
(£5,411 for a childminder). This is well above 
the national average rate of pay increases.86  
The government has promised to double the 
amount of free childcare to 30 hours a week 
for working parents of three to four year-olds 
from 2016,87  but childcare providers say that 
government funding is insufficient to cover the 
costs of this care. Until recently, fees paid by 
parents purchasing more than their 15 hours of 
free childcare have been set so that government 
funding plus fee income would cover costs. Care 
has to be funded adequately; otherwise it will 
lead to a worsening of working conditions and 
quality of the care provided.88
Given the gender division of labour, high 
childcare costs limit women’s paid work. 
Whether and when partnered mothers decide 
to return to work after maternity leave is strongly 
influenced by the net costs, often assessed 
as the difference between their earnings and 
childcare costs (and other expenses associated 
with being in work). High childcare costs make 
paid work less attractive, though longer-term 
considerations reduce the disincentive. Part-time 
work or withdrawing from the labour force even 
for a short time has an adverse impact on long 
term earnings potential and pension entitlements 
and given the probability of divorce (42 per cent 
in 201289 with a higher rate of seperation for 
cohabiting couples), withdrawing from the labour 
market is a financially risky decision. 
The 2015 parental leave legislation90 reserves 
a minimal, two week independent entitlement 
for fathers and the mother must be eligible for 
parental leave. So far the take up rate by fathers 
has been low. While nine out of ten men take two 
weeks of paid paternity, less than 2 per cent have 
claimed any of the “shared leave” partly because 
the payment is low relative to male earnings.  
Experience from Norway suggests that as 
long as parents are asked to decide how to 
allocate leave between them, it will be allocated 
primarily to women. However, when a set 
number of days is reserved for men, the take up 
rate is far higher and eventually becomes usual 
practice. The reasoning behind the Norwegian 
parental leave scheme, introduced in 1993, 
is not only to facilitate the opportunities for 
women to combine work and childcare but 
to ensure that the benefits and burdens of 
a working and family life are shared, and to 
strengthen the father-child relationship. 
Finding solutions 
Overall the organisation of the workplace 
and the domestic division of labour retain the 
imprint of a male breadwinner society. This 
model presents a challenge to gender equality 
within employment and in society more 
generally because it limits the extent to which 
women can participate in the labour market and 
influences their decisions about what kinds of 
jobs to combine with domestic responsibilities. 
Substituting women’s care and domestic 
labour by commoditising care is only a partial 
solution as it tends to replace gender divisions 
in the labour market with social class and racial 
divisions. Instead it is critical to consider new 
working arrangements which allow a more 
even distribution of paid work and caring work 
between women and men. 
In the meantime, it is important to recognise 
that good quality care work creates positive 
social externalities or social gains in terms 
of more educated and rounded citizens. 
Recognising the social value of care work 
provides an economically rational argument for 
proper funding. More importantly, adequate 
care work is a matter of both social and gender 
justice that helps foster equality between 
women and men, and enables low-paid women 
to combine paid work and caring.
Inequality in paid work
Occupational stereotyping
There are no concrete walls barring women’s 
access to the labour market or to particular 
occupations in the UK.91 So why do women 
disproportionately “choose” sectors and 
occupations that are characterised by lower 
pay? Given the diversity among women in 
terms of preferences, capabilities and skills 
it is unlikely that, as a group, they simply 
prefer comparatively low paid and more junior 
positions. The explanation lies in structural 
barriers which impede entry and progression.
The asymmetric division of care and domestic work 
between women and men, together with the 
limited availability and affordability of childcare, 
has already been discussed. In addition there are 
deeply rooted gendered social norms that reinforce 
existing understandings of appropriate roles for 
women and men and the value of different jobs. 
Occupations become gender stereotyped and, 
while the boundaries vary across cultures and 
over time (indeed such variations reflect their 
social/cultural rather than natural construction), 
they nonetheless have a certain fixity that shapes 
expectations, making employees reluctant to enter 
gender incongruent occupations and employers 
reluctant to hire people that deviate from the 
normal worker profile.
While the overall occupational pattern reflects 
these gender stereotypes, there has been 
some change as a result of equalities and 
diversity policies. Such policies are based on the 
business case for equality, especially in senior 
and high-paid management positions, have 
thrown resources at tackling unconscious bias92  
and created a more woman-friendly working 
environment. The Davies Review into female 
representation on boards offered an “action 
orientated framework”, setting out “what 
good looked like” and handing responsibility to 
business.93 The recommended target of 25 per 
cent for women’s representation on boards is 
likely to be achieved by January 2016, but it is 
not clear why this figure was chosen – except 
that it was thought to be attainable, and/or 
what will happen subsequently. Even though 
the steering group admit that more progress 
is required, there is no intention of moving 
to mandatory quotas, which the Commission 
recommends.94 
However, changes overall have been minimal. 
Instead, policies tend to focus on individual 
employees. Most policies that aim to increase 
the proportion of women rest on changing/
enhancing women’s opportunities via building 
“confidence”,95  mentoring and encouraging 
of “leaning in.”96  This approach focuses on 
women’s supply characteristics, (assumed to be 
deficient) rather than asking and explaining why 
they matter. More recently, awareness of the 
gender imbalance among decision makers has 
increased and the idea of unconscious bias is in 
vogue97 but only rarely is the prevailing elite and 
masculine employment culture questioned. This 
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issue is particularly evident in management where 
a 22 per cent gender pay gap exists, equivalent 
to women working for nothing for 57 days a 
year. At senior level the gap rises to 35 per cent 
and attributed in part to the bonus culture where 
bonuses paid to men have been found to be 
double those of women.98 Attributing this to 
unconscious bias rather overlooks the research 
that shows that wherever discretion exists so too 
does bias, eg, the system of bonus rewards is 
consciously chosen even though it is known that 
discretion leads to bias.99 
Women who attain high-level positons can be 
likely to emulate the male model of working and 
manage their work-life balance by outsourcing 
caring and domestic tasks. Outsourcing  leads 
to divisions between women by social class. 
Care and domestic work is low paid, feminised 
and has a high migrant and BME density. Larger 
firms often assist senior women   by providing 
concierge services at work, for example 
emergency crèches or nannies. In addition, their 
high incomes allows them to draw on private 
services, like using cleaners, laundry services, 
private cars and taxis to ease travel time. In 
these respects there has been a transfer of 
responsibilities rather than any transformation of 
social roles.100 
Evidence presented to the Commission from 
research for a private bank trying to increase the 
proportion of senior women in order to meet 
client preferences reinforces the ideas discussed 
above. To improve diversity the bank provided 
support groups for a range of identities and 
mentoring for junior employees (though women 
interviewed expressed concerns about the lack 
of women mentors). Yet the bank failed to 
tackle “demand side” problems. “Presentism” 
continued to be expected even when unnecessary 
for business reasons, and there was a lack of 
transparency in relation to bonus payments and 
promotion. Even though part of these decisions 
were based on formal criteria, discretionary 
elements remained which – as the wider literature 
suggests – facilitates bias and results in gendered 
and racialised unequal outcomes.101 In addition, 
employees reported the prevalence of a macho 
culture which women found both intimidating 
and unpleasant.102  
Evidence submitted to the Commission’s section 
on the Law further illustrates the entrenchment 
of demand side problems. The proportion of 
Queen’s Counsel lawyers who are women has 
increased from zero in 1975 to 10 per cent in 
2010. Change is glacial despite a commitment 
to increasing diversity, including statutory 
obligations under the Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005. It is clear that demand-side barriers 
remain, as this illustration of continued bias 
from Lord Berwick shows:
  
“I would like, obviously, the judiciary 
to be as diverse as we can get it. 
But that must not interfere with the 
fundamental principle that we have 
got to choose the best man for the 
job.” Lord Lloyd of Berwick, 2003.103 
The remark, made 12 years ago, could be a 
linguistic oversight, but it could also reflect a 
deep-seated unconscious bias and more widely 
it is clear that stereotyping and conscious bias 
against the “outgroup,” ie, those that are 
different, persists in many quarters. In a 2015 
report for the government investigating non-
educational barriers to the elite professions, 
an employer argued that it was more efficient 
to recruit people from a similar background to 
himself, stating:
“I’m sorry to say it, but if you deal 
with someone who is of a similar 
background to you, one of the most 
fundamental things that occur in 
that exchange is efficiency. And I’m 
sorry but it’s absolutely true that 
homogeneity breeds a huge amount 
of efficiency in organisations… I 
can sort of write, you know, an 
obscure comment in the margin 
and you’ll know exactly what I’m 
talking about. You get my jokes. 
There’s not a risk that I’m going to 
offend you by saying something, 
because we get each other and 
that’s hugely efficient. And it’s very 
hard not to be attracted to that in 
big organisations, because we are 
driving at efficiency all the time.104 
Similar evidence of prejudice towards others 
is reported in the Politics, Media and Culture 
sections of this report and supported by a much 
wider literature, dating from the 1970s.105  
Gender imbalance in seniority matters because 
it not only impacts on the gender pay gap, 
discussed below, but also reflects differences in 
Source: Modified from UNDP 2007
NB There are few technical constraints on the size and shape of the fiscal space but rather the space could be 
pulled in different directions depending on political decisions that ideally would be in the social interest which 
includes gender equality. For example with respect to domestic revenue mobilization a gender audit is likely to 
show that w omen, as lower earners are more likely to benefit from reducing indirect taxes while men are more 
likey to benefit from lowering the tax thresholds.
Official development assistance
Carry out gender audits of conditionality criteria attached 
to IMF and ECB assistance for EU member states.
Cuts in public expenditure and services disadvantage 
women disproportionately.
Domestic revenue mobilization
Ensure gender audits are carried out when 
making direct or indirect tax changes. 
Deficit financing
Carry out gender audits of conditions 
attached to and expenditure 
associated with borrowing. 
Re-prioritisation and efficiency 
of expenditures
Ensure that gender audits are 
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well as physical infrastructure – 
finance child care, education as 
well as roads.
Figure 8 A gender perspective on public finances106
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power and influence. The increased presence 
of women will not definitively bring about 
change but their different social positioning 
means that they may be aware of the barriers 
to progress women experience and, potentially, 
be more open to thinking about inclusive styles 
of working. For these reasons, presence on 
the board matters, but presence is even more 
important in positions of direct managerial 
responsibility where influence on employees is 
more direct. Absence from the top positions and 
how different kinds of work are valued are two 
factors that underlie the gender pay gap.
Redressing the gender pay gap
Most studies on the gender pay gap focus 
mainly on the supply side by examining the 
characteristics of individual workers such as 
qualifications and years of experience, but these 
are only able to account for only a third of the 
gap. The “unexplained” part is attributed to 
discrimination and left largely unexplained. 
Focusing on individual variables tends to 
emphasise “gender deficits”. In other words, as 
discussed above, it emphasises the supply side, 
leading to training schemes and confidence 
building progammes for women, rather than 
considering the demand side and training for the 
decision makers to guard against unconscious 
bias as well as modifying the promotion and 
pay determination processes and the working 
environment including more flexible working 
arrangements but without pay penalties.
Raising these broader social questions is 
important because although individuals can raise 
their level of qualifications, qualifications alone 
are not sufficient to generate gender equity and 
currently low paid jobs will continue to exist, 
indeed they are predicted to expand especially 
given the growing demand for care work, so 
these individual solutions will be unable to 
remedy gender inequity in society.
With respect to pay, orthodox economic 
theory maintains that pay reflects employees’ 
contributions to output and so wages are 
considered to be fair, reflecting legitimate 
market processes.107  Critics, however, have 
outlined a number of problems with this 
theory. For example there is little association 
between the vast increase in wages in the top 
decile, especially the top 1 per cent, and the 
performance of their companies or with their 
qualifications or years of experience. These high 
earnings have been attributed to the “power” 
that managers of large firms and organisations 
have “to set their own remuneration”.108 
This power in turn depends on their bargaining 
capacity within the hierarchy and with prevailing 
social norms which vary over time and space. 
Executive compensation of several million Euros 
a year is still less acceptable today in Sweden, 
Germany, France, Japan and Italy than in the 
United States or Britain, reflecting different 
“beliefs about the contributions different 
individuals make to the firm’s output and to 
economic growth in general”109  and how it 
should be valued in comparison to others. 
This wider perspective raises questions about 
the comparative value and status of work 
and how wages are determined. If wages are 
partially determined by social norms, then it 
opens the way for questioning the current 
earnings distributions and examining the link 
between pay and the social value of different 
forms of work, which is central to questions of 
gender equity given continuing segregation in 
employment by occupation.
Recommendations
There are many challenges to tackle if we are 
to redress gendered imbalances in power that 
operate at different levels: from the management 
of the economy, to policies and practices within 
firms, organisations and communities, to personal 
relations within families and households. These 
challenges are complex and affected by the fact 
that real lives are shaped by the way that gender 
intersects with race, ethnicity and citizenship status. 
The following proposals and principles are critical. 
To obtain gender equality, social goals need to 
be targets of economic policy. Only in this way 
can the economy be made to serve society rather 
than vice versa. Current understandings of the 
economy need to be broadened to include the 
reproductive sector and unpaid care work. Ideas 
for a gender equitable, sustainable and caring 
economy have been outlined by the Women’s 
Budget Group in their Plan F briefing111 and there 
is growing evidence to suggest that such policies 
will generate higher levels of employment and 
economic growth. The purpose of the economy 
should be to support social well-being.112
1.   Socially fair and gender sensitive 
macroeconomic policies   
To achieve greater gender equality, we 
recommend  a change in the direction of 
macroeconomic policy. Gender-sensitive 
macroeconomic policies are necessary for 
sustainable and inclusive development. 
Evidence shows that the current austerity policies 
have had a greater adverse impact on women, 
especially BME and low-income families, so we 
are not “all in this together.”113 The Government’s 
strategy to eliminate public debt contrasts with 
other western economies and conventional 
economic analysis. Alternatives are possible and 
likely to produce more inclusive outcomes, higher 
levels of employment and overall well-being.114
Women on low incomes with caring needs and 
obligations need collectivised public services and 
social security payments to boost their incomes. 
Public expenditure is critical to prevent the loss 
of local services, including childcare centres, 
refuges for domestic violence survivors, and law 
centres to ensure access to the legal system for 
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all. Moreover investing in social as well as physical 
infrastructure will bring future economic gains.
2.   Gender mainstream all  
government policies
We recommend that gender-responsive 
budgeting, gender auditing and impact 
analysis be introduced so as to identify the 
distributive impact of economic policy-
making.115 Gender budgeting identifies the 
gendered impact of policies and is technically 
possible, so it is incumbent on the government to 
ensure that this is done to the highest standards 
that are available. 
The government’s own impact assessments are 
cursory. This important task is therefore left to 
voluntary organisations such as the UK Women’s 
Budget Group, but these require funding. 
3.  Mandatory quotas 
We recommend that mandatory quotas 
be introduced to ensure greater gender 
balance in decision making positions and be 
accompanied by measures to ensure presence 
is sustained. Quotas backed by legislation are 
one of the most significant ways of effecting 
change; they are more effective than soft 
company initiatives and help ensure that society 
and firms reflect diverse ideas and talents.116 
Existing legislation allows gender to be used 
as a tie-breaker in recruitment and promotions 
decision-making where merit is equal.117 
Quotas represent a “minimal condition” for 
securing change. Presence alone is not sufficient, 
policies and practices cannot be presumed from 
gender identity. Gender-equitable policies need 
to be practised throughout an organisation to 
effect change, and support for senior women is 
necessary to prevent quotas from becoming a 
revolving door for women. 
4.   Gender awareness training for 
government employees 
We recommend that training in gender 
awareness be introduced so as to ensure 
effective gender mainstreaming. Within the 
private sector considerable attention is being given 
to the idea of unconscious bias but less to the 
gender composition of decision makers and the 
discretionary procedures that allow such bias to be 
effective. Evidence presented to the Commission 
shows that promotion and pay decisions should 
be based on formal, transparent criteria. Suitability 
for different jobs needs to be based on objective 
criteria and discretion minimised to avoid particular 
qualities being linked to gender stereotypes and 
existing patterns of bias. 
5.   Revalue work, identify and challenge 
unequal social norms 
We recommend that new methods of pay 
determination be introduced in order to 
better reflect the social value of work done as 
well as the costs of living. The gender pay gap is 
due to labour market segregation by occupation, 
status and working time. Evidence reviewed by 
the Commission suggests that pay is determined 
by social norms and by the power of people at the 
very top to determine their own pay.118 This power 
needs to be acknowledged and challenged.
6.  Create a National Care Service 
We recommend that a National Care 
Service be established to ensure that holistic 
affordable, accessible, appropriate care is 
available. It should ensure that the workers 
employed are rewarded appropriately for the 
complexity and skilled character of the work 
they do, given the high value that people 
place on human life and wellbeing.
Care provision is vital to individual and social 
well-being, and resolving the care question is 
fundamental to redressing and ultimately resolving 
gender inequality. Everybody requires care at some 
point in their lives and a majority of people provide 
care at some stage. Evidence presented to the 
Commission shows that good quality care creates 
positive social externalities or social gains in terms 
of more educated and rounded citizens. Similar to 
street lighting, it is a matter for public, collectivised 
support. Recognising the economic and social 
value of care work provides an economically 
rational argument for social investment in care. 
7.  Gender friendly working patterns
We recommend that government, institutions 
and firms organise their legislation, regulations 
and working patterns in ways that recognise 
people as caring citizens. Collectively society, 
industry and government must enact measures for 
an environment where people have time to care 
without adverse implications for job choices and 
career development. Measures should ensure that:
(1)   All jobs should be available on a 
part-time basis without adverse 
career impacts.
(2)   The long-hours culture and 
expectation of presenteeism 
should be eradicated and people 
leave work on time. 
(3)   Men as well as women should 
have time to care without 
penalties. Introduce individual, 
earmarked, non-transferable rights 
to paid leave. Such efforts need 
to be designed and implemented 
carefully. The direct provision of 
high-quality care services benefits 
everyone in much the same way, 
while policies which replace 
foregone earnings invariably 
distribute more resources towards 
the highly paid and so reinforce 
income inequality.119
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that a woman is less qualified and will be less productive than the person (male) who 
would otherwise have been appointed. In addition women sometimes express concerns 
that their authority will be undermined if their presence is seen to derive from quotas 
rather than merit.
118 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, (Harvard: Belknap Press).
119 Evidence provided to GIP commission by W. Sigle, 14/11/2014. 
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In politics, as in all the spheres 
addressed in this report, we are 
in a period of simultaneous stasis 
and change. Women have been 
involved in political movements 
and campaigns for centuries, but 
it was only in 1918 that those 
over 30 (those thought mature 
enough to know their own minds) 
won the right to vote and stand 
for election to parliament. It was 
only in 1928, when the suffrage 
was extended to all citizens 
over the age of 21, regardless of 
their sex, that Britain became 
a democracy. Sex remained, 
however, a key determinant of 
access to political power: it took 
seventy years from the point at 
which women could first stand for 
election and numerous general 
elections for the proportion of 
women in parliament to cross the 
5 per cent barrier.
POLITICS
27
Table 1 Women Members elected at General 
Elections (1970-2015)1
Election 
Year
Total number 
of women
% of all MPs
1970 26 4.1%
1974 23 3.6%
1974 27 4.3%
1979 19 3.0%
1983 23 3.5%
1987 41 6.3%
1992 60 9.2%
1997 120 18.2%
2001 118 17.9%
2005 128 19.8%
2010 143 22.8%
2015 191 29.4%
In the Nordic countries, which till recently 
topped the world league tables,2 it was the 
1970s and 80s that were the transformative 
period. By the early 1980s, the proportion of 
women in parliament had risen to 31 per cent 
in Finland, 28 per cent in Sweden, and 26 
per cent in Norway. In 1994, Sweden became 
the first country in the world to cross the 40 
per cent barrier. In the UK, by contrast, the 
significant shifts in the gender composition 
of parliament came a couple of decades 
later, and primarily through the adoption of 
various forms of affirmative action. The Liberal 
Democrats were the first to implement special 
measures to raise the proportion of women 
selected as candidates, introducing in the 1980s 
the compulsory shortlisting of women in all 
candidate selection processes. This initiative was 
later followed by the Labour Party, but neither 
initiative had much impact on the numbers. The 
more dramatic step came in 1993, when Labour 
women activists persuaded the party conference 
to endorse a policy of all-women shortlists in 
half of the winnable seats for which there was 
no incumbent MP seeking re-election. While all-
women shortlists were (temporarily) abandoned 
after two male party members won an industrial 
tribunal ruling that they were in contravention 
of the Sex Discrimination Act, sufficient numbers 
of women had already been selected by this 
process to make a significant difference in 
the 1997 general election. The proportion of 
women MPs almost doubled from 9.2 per cent 
to 18.2 per cent. 
The creation of the Welsh Assembly in 1998 
and Scottish Parliament in 1999 provided 
a further opportunity for the gendering of 
political power. This was partly because the 
voting system adopted in the new bodies – the 
additional member system3 – is more amenable 
to the application of gender quotas, but mostly 
because activists in both countries pressed 
strongly for equality measures. The Labour Party 
adopted a policy of “twinning” constituencies 
(adopting a woman as candidate in one and a 
man in the other); in Wales, Plaid Cymru used 
a version of the “zipper” system, selecting 
women candidates for the first and third places 
on its lists of additional members; and while 
the Scottish National Party adopted no formal 
quota mechanism, it too selected significant 
numbers of women to run for election. In the 
first elections in 1999, women took 37 per 
cent of the seats in the Scottish Parliament 
and a stunning 40 per cent of the seats in the 
Welsh Assembly. Sixteen years later, in the 2015 
general election, the UK parliament started to 
catch up:  191 women MPs were elected, now 
making up 29.4 per cent of the total. 
Many have hailed this as the breakthrough. 
Setting aside for the moment the very poor 
figures from the Northern Ireland Legislative 
Assembly, we now find women filling roughly 
one in three of elected positions through the 
country as a whole. 
Percentage of women in the  
country’s elected bodies:
•   29 per cent of UK MPs (Members  
of Pariament)
•   35 per cent of MSPs (Members of  
Scottish Parliament)
•   42 per cent of AMs (Members of  
the Welsh Assembly)
•   19 per cent of MLAs (Members of the 
Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly)
•   31.9 per cent of local councillors in  
England, 26.3 per cent in Wales, 26.7 per 
cent in Northern Ireland, and 24.3 per  
cent in Scotland4 
The percentage in the world as a whole is 
just over one in five, so this now puts the UK 
significantly ahead of the world average: we 
are currently 38th in the Inter Parliamentary 
Union’s global league table, behind Nepal and 
just above Trinidad and Tobago.5 In terms of 
political participation, political representation, 
and even the elusive leadership roles, things 
look considerably brighter than before. There 
is virtually no difference between the sexes as 
regards voting in elections (age is the more 
significant variable here), and though women 
are still slightly less likely than men to be 
involved in political campaigns or join political 
parties, the activism gap is now very slender.6 
Women currently lead three of the UK’s political 
parties – Nicola Sturgeon for the Scottish 
National Party, Leanne Wood for Plaid Cymru, 
Natalie Bennett for the Green Party – and at the 
time of writing, two women and two men are 
contesting the leadership of the Labour Party. 
Though women have been appointed to only 
seven out of twenty two cabinet positions in the 
UK government, there are now equal numbers 
of women and men with cabinet responsibilities 
in Scotland. The Trades Union Congress has its 
first female General Secretary, Frances O’Grady. 
Are we then on an upward path towards full 
gender equality in political influence and power? 
It has taken a good hundred years to arrive at 
this point, but can we now say that, as regards 
politics at least, the battle is pretty much over?
Sadly, no. Firstly, even one in three (less than 
this in the House of Commons, very much less in 
the Northern Ireland Assembly) means that men 
are over-represented in politics to the tune of 
two to one.7 Secondly, we cannot assume that 
change is set to continue in a steady upward 
curve. On past performance, backward dips are 
frequent, as are long periods of stasis, and since 
much of the recent improvement has depended 
on quota mechanisms, further improvements 
are likely to require further such action. Finally, 
numbers alone do not guarantee shifts in power, 
for the gendering of policies and practices is 
deep rooted, and not easily changed. Political 
power is not a commodity that can be simply 
redistributed, but works in complex, often 
hidden ways to sustain the status quo.
1.  One in three is too little 
The under-representation of women and 
over-representation of men matters. It matters 
because of the messages conveyed about 
women as second-class citizens, better suited 
to the “private” world of family and household 
than to “public” political life. As a number of 
contributors to the Commission noted, so long 
as the image of the typical politician remains so 
resolutely masculinised, women active in politics 
will continue to appear as the exceptions, 
endlessly commented on in their identity “as 
women” and unable to escape reference to 
their gender. The over-representation of men 
also matters for what might seem the opposite 
reason: because it makes it harder to address, 
or even acknowledge, the gendered nature of 
policies and laws. Men and women have, on 
average, and over the course of their lifetimes, 
different life-experiences. For women, these 
may include pregnancy, a greater vulnerability 
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than men to rape and domestic violence, a 
much increased likelihood of becoming the 
ones responsible for caring for the young, sick 
and elderly, and a greater probability of low 
incomes and limited personal wealth. Different 
experiences generate different interests and 
perspectives, and it is risky in politics to rely 
on those who do not share your experiences, 
interests, or perspectives to represent you. 
Politicians do not blindly implement whatever the 
electorate votes on during an election campaign, 
and this is not just because they may tear up 
their promises. New challenges inevitably arise 
in the course of each parliament, and in facing 
these challenges, politicians draw not only on 
party ideology but on their own perceptions of 
what counts as a priority. In these moments, 
“presence” matters almost as much as the ideas 
and policies contained in party manifestos.8 
These two aspects might seem to work in 
opposition to one another, for the first points 
to what we might term an “over-gendering” 
of women in politics, and the second to an 
“under-gendering” of the political agenda. It is, 
however, precisely this combination that tends 
to characterise gendered relations of power, and 
makes it so hard to challenge them. Reducing 
people to their gender or sexuality or ethnicity 
or race, treating everything they do or say as if 
it reflects this one characteristic, is a powerful 
mechanism for keeping people in check, and part 
of what can make it hard to speak out about 
what others deem “merely” women’s concerns. 
People sometimes say we don’t want women 
representing women’s interests, any more than 
we want men representing the interests of 
men. At one level this is indeed true. In politics, 
people do not simply speak to the needs and 
concerns of their own group nor do we wish 
them to do so. From John Stuart Mill onwards, 
there have been male politicians who have 
campaigned courageously for the equality 
of the sexes. From the election of the first 
woman MP onwards, there have been women 
politicians who were reluctant to address 
gender issues because they anticipated – with 
some justification – that this would undermine 
their credentials as serious politicians. It is also 
the case that many of the interests we might 
regard as of special significance to women 
(better childcare provision, for example, greater 
security against male violence, improved work/
life balance) are, or should be, of equal concern 
to men. Yet with these qualifications, we should 
question the capacity of a legislature dominated 
by men to reflect the experiences, perspectives, 
and interests of all the society. The failure to 
recognise that the austerity policies adopted by 
recent governments bear disproportionately on 
women is only one of many possible illustrations 
of this. The longstanding neglect of sexual and 
child abuse is another.
There is considerable evidence, from the UK 
and elsewhere, that women in politics are 
more likely than their male counterparts to 
contribute to debates on gender issues or 
initiate policies on violence against women, 
inequality in the workforce, and crises in the 
organisation of care.9 When Sarah Childs, for 
example, interviewed newly elected Labour 
women from the 1997 intake, she found 
that nearly two thirds of them thought their 
presence in parliament had helped raise 
the profile of women’s concerns, focusing 
attention on violence against women, including 
forced marriages and sexual harassment, on 
opportunities for women in employment and 
education, on child care, family-friendly policies, 
the diagnosis and treatment of breast cancer, 
and provision for emergency contraception.10  
Party affiliation also matters here, for women in 
left or centre-left parties have been somewhat 
more likely to see themselves as carrying a 
responsibility to speak for and about women’s 
experiences, but gender has an effect across the 
political spectrum. Indeed on matters relating 
to abortion, the treatment of rape victims, or 
women’s employment rights, women in the 
more conservative parties are often closer to 
their female colleagues in other political parties 
than to the men in their own.11  
Changing the gender composition enables 
different voices to be heard and new agendas 
to be addressed, and not just in a simple male/
female binary. As much of the evidence to the 
Commission stressed, needs, interests, and 
experiences do not vary by gender alone, but 
by location within a range of power hierarchies, 
structured by race, ethnicity, age, sexuality, 
religion, culture, disability. This, indeed, is a 
further reason why achieving one in three 
representation is so inadequate; for even when 
the number of women politicians goes up, those 
elected are rarely representative of women 
as whole. Preethi Sundaram (Fawcett Society) 
puts it thus: “the women who have made it 
to public office are remarkably similar – white, 
middle class, well-educated and within a narrow 
age range. BME [Black and Minority Ethnic] 
women are still under-represented at all levels, 
as are women from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds and both older and younger 
women. The diversity of women’s voices is not 
proportionally represented within the political 
realm.”12  No-one expects parliament to be 
a simple mirror of the voting population, to 
reflect back in exact proportions its gender 
composition, ethnic diversity, or class divisions, 
but without some rough approximation to that 
diversity, our politicians will almost certainly fail 
to register key issues and concerns. We need 
not just more women in politics, but enough to 
capture the diversity of experiences, campaigns 
and concerns. 
On this matter, the most recent general election 
does provide some good news. Minority ethnic 
women are generally poorly represented in 
national legislatures, much more poorly than 
minority ethnic men, and global comparisons 
suggest they have been the least likely to benefit 
when initiatives are developed to address 
(separately) the under-representation of women 
or the under-representation of minority ethnic 
groups.13 Quotas for women, that is, tend to 
favour the election of women from majority 
ethnic groups, while provisions to enhance 
minority representation tend to favour the 
men. As Kimberlé Crenshaw has argued in her 
influential analysis of anti-discrimination law, 
minority ethnic women may find themselves 
unable to take advantage either of provisions 
relating to gender discrimination or of provisions 
relating to racial discrimination, precisely because 
their experience is a combination of both.14 
However, in the 2015 UK election, this rather 
gloomy pattern has been somewhat modified. 
The proportion of black, Asian and minority MPs 
remains significantly below the proportion in the 
population as a whole – 6.3 per cent as against 
12.9 per cent of the population – and male MPs 
are still overwhelmingly and disproportionately 
white. But minority women now make up 10.5 
per cent of the women elected to parliament, 
and much of the increase has come about 
through the implementation of the Labour 
Party’s all women short lists.15  Contrary to 
what critics of this initiative have sometimes 
suggested, it seems that the focus on tackling 
under-representation by gender has not been at 
the expense of addressing under-representation 
by race. 
2.  There is no steady upward trajectory
There are a number of common-sense reasons 
why it has been harder for women than men 
to put themselves forward for political office. 
(These are what researchers call the “supply-
side” reasons.16) Time is at a premium for 
women because they are the ones who continue 
to assume the bulk of caring responsibilities: 
this is why achieving work/life balance –
something of importance to all of us – is of 
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particular urgency for women. Unlike their 
male counterparts who may also have children 
or elderly parents, women frequently have to 
choose between their care responsibilities and 
a political career. One especially striking statistic 
from the House of Commons is that 45 per cent 
of the women elected as MPs but only 28 per 
cent of the men had no children.17 Women are 
also less likely than men to be encouraged to 
put themselves forward in politics. As evidence 
to the Commission demonstrated, men active 
in local councils are often encouraged by family 
and friends to look beyond the local council 
to the national stage. This happens more 
rarely for women.18 Women are, moreover, 
actively discouraged from a life in politics by 
gendered practices and assumptions and the 
routine disparagement of their knowledge and 
abilities. There is considerable evidence for this 
in the experiences of women in the House of 
Commons, as regards both the macho style 
of Westminster politics, and the denigration 
of women’s speaking skills.19 Evidence to the 
recent Report on Women in Politics and the 
Northern Ireland Assembly suggests that the 
situation is even worse there: a number of 
submissions noted the “hostile” culture, the 
highly adversarial style of politics, and the 
“frequently intimidating” behaviour of AMs.20 
The representation of women politicians in the 
media, including the continuous scrutiny of 
hairstyle or dress, is also a disincentive.21  
These factors help explain why many politically 
involved and experienced women decide against 
entering or staying in electoral politics. They also 
help explain why those who do come forward are 
often unrepresentative, by social class, or whether 
or not they have young children, of women as 
a whole. But comparative studies show that 
the really crucial determining factor explaining 
why women make up 40-50 per cent of elected 
politicians in some countries, but less than 30 per 
cent in others, is the gatekeeping role of political 
parties.22 (The “demand-side” reasons.) It is not 
women’s “reluctance” or “lack of ambition” that 
is the problem. Nor is it the voters who decide 
whether we have male or female representatives. 
It is that small sub-group inside the political 
parties that finds it so hard to select women. 
In the Northern Ireland Assembly, where there 
is provision for political parties to co-opt new 
members to fill vacancies that arise between 
elections (so not even submitting their choices 
to the electorate), figures on co-opted members 
provide a particularly stark illustration of the power 
and preferences of party selectors. Between 2007 
and 2011, there were fourteen co-options to the 
Assembly, including to three seats that had been 
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previously held by women. All 14 of the new 
members co-opted were men.23  
Overt discrimination among selectors has by no 
means disappeared – examples mentioned in 
the recent Report of the Speakers Conference 
on Parliamentary Representation include being 
told that the constituency was “not ready 
for a woman” and cases where the CVs of 
women candidates were “lost”24 – but even 
where overt sexism has diminished, the choice 
of candidates and leaders is made against a 
backdrop of assumptions about what makes a 
“good” politician that is itself deeply gendered. 
Cross-national research into leadership 
preferences indicates a significant bias among 
male politicians against the characteristics more 
typically associated with women’s than men’s 
lives: coming later into politics, for example, or 
from a background in education rather than 
business or the professions.25 (Interestingly, 
women politicians do not exhibit the same 
kind of bias against these gendered skill-sets.) 
As is noted elsewhere in our Report, the very 
understanding of competency or merit is already 
gendered, and selections are then rarely neutral.  
Experience in UK politics still chimes with this. 
Against the combination of supply side and 
demand side obstacles, it would be foolhardy 
to anticipate a steady upward curve in women’s 
political representation. To the contrary, 
advances often prove fragile or lack what has 
been termed the “contagion effect”.26 The 
early experience of the Scottish Parliament is 
instructive here. This was a new institution, 
not burdened with long established gendered 
practices, not facing existing male incumbents 
who might reasonably expect to be re-selected, 
and it came into being against a backdrop of 
effective campaigning by women’s groups and 
caucuses. But the initiatives that produced 
that impressive 37 per cent in the first election 
were not sustained, and while the proportion 
of women MSPs rose further to 39.5 per cent 
in the second election, it then dropped back 
in the third one to 33.3 per cent. By this time 
(2007), none of the parties was applying a 
quota mechanism in the selection of candidates 
for the constituency seats, and the proportion of 
women elected to represent the SNP had fallen 
from 42.9 per cent in 1999 to 33.3 per cent in 
2003 and 25.5 per cent in 2007.27  Overall, the 
proportion of women among MSPs, stunning as 
it looked in 1999, now seems to have settled at 
around one third. In Wales, there was an even 
more dramatic initial success: 40 per cent in 
the first election rising to 50 per cent in 2003, 
and after a by-election in 2006, a brief period 
in which there were more women than men in 
the Welsh Assembly. Though the percentage 
remains impressive – the highest among the 
UK’s elected bodies – it has subsequently slipped 
back to 41.6 per cent.
The trajectory and speed of change cannot 
be easily guaranteed. In the 2015 general 
election, the Labour Party, SNP, Green Party, 
Figure 1 Percentage of female MPs by party, 2010 to 2015
Source: Institute for Government analysis of House of Commons Library figures
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and Northern Ireland Alliance Party all selected 
women to stand in more than one in three 
of the constituencies they contested, with 
the result that 99 of Labour’s 232 MPs, and 
20 of the SNP’s 56 MPs are women. But the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats selected 
women to contest only one in four: no woman 
was elected to represent the Liberal Democrats, 
and only 68 to represent the Conservative Party.
Party variations remain stark, and far from 
indicating a historic turning point, the recent 
improvement in gender composition is better 
understood as reflecting two factors. It reflects 
the continued use of all-women short lists by the 
Labour Party, and the fact that the SNP previously 
held only six of the Scottish constituencies, 
hence had no incumbency factor to deal with in 
selecting women as candidates. While the overall 
increase is clearly good news, it does not yet 
establish a major shift, and does not guarantee 
that we are now on the upward curve.  
Similar points can be made about the proportion 
of women in government. In the UK, we have 
not seen a cabinet composed exclusively of men 
since John Major declared one in 1990, and 
governments are increasingly sensitive to media 
and other criticism when they fail to offer cabinet 
responsibilities to women. Women held 20 per 
cent of the ministerial positions under the 2010-15 
Coalition Government, and hold 30 per cent in 
the first post-2015 Conservative Government. 
Other governments have committed themselves to 
50/50 parity – including that of Francois Hollande 
in France and Nicola Sturgeon in Scotland – but 
the new norm in Westminster, it seems, is that the 
proportion of women in cabinet should roughly 
approximate their proportion in parliament as a 
whole. The criteria for ministerial office are highly 
informal: successful ministers refer to “luck”, 
“getting noticed”, “loyalty” and “reward for 
service to the party”, so this is a prime area where 
it is hard to break old patterns and assumptions.28 
Advances depend on continuing political will, 
and while the election of women to parliament 
works like a ratchet (growing slowly, but only 
rarely falling back to a significantly lower level), the 
appointment of women to cabinet posts is said to 
be more like a see-saw.29 One government may 
give high priority to gender parity, while the next 
pays it only lip-service, and even when the same 
party assumes office, it may subsequently change 
its practice. 
3.  Numbers do not translate  
directly into power
Power is not just a matter of numbers: 
important as the numbers are, the gendered 
nature of political power is never just a question 
of how many women and how many men. The 
object is to change the agenda, to ensure that 
budgets do not inadvertently penalise women, 
that strategies for tackling violence are better 
informed and more adequately funded, that 
crises in social care are recognised as a major 
public priority, and so on. As Claire Annesley 
puts it, “gendering policy does not refer merely 
to the inclusion of women’s ideas or issues 
onto the mainstream policy agenda but to the 
renewal of the whole policymaking process to 
give men and women real and equal access and 
influence at each stage.”30 Part of the difficulty 
in achieving this renewal is that institutions are 
themselves profoundly gendered, operating 
through a complex array of unspoken rules and 
practices that help to sustain an older order even 
when the numbers and faces change. Increasing 
the percentage of women has the potential to 
disrupt these practices, because it makes visible 
previously unquestioned assumptions about 
what matters and who carries authority, and 
thereby enables new norms to emerge. But it 
is not easy to challenge dominant norms, and 
it is especially difficult when those norms are 
unspoken. The “hidden life of institutions”31  
and their often invisible informal rules have 
considerable staying power. 
Nowadays, the rules do not involve direct 
sexism, though some of the practices do. In 
the late 1980s, one Tory MP used to address 
every woman MP as Betty, on the principle 
that they all looked the same to him.32 This 
does not happen now, though  in 2001, 
women MPs could still be faced with shouts 
of “melons, melons” when they got up to 
speak, and as recently as 2011, David Cameron 
advised Angela Eagle to “calm down dear” 
when she challenged some of his claims.33 A 
number of women MPs have reported being 
barred access to “members only” areas by 
staff who presumably found it hard to equate 
being an MP with being female and young. It 
is possible – maybe necessary – to brush off 
moments like these, but the cumulative effect 
is to reinforce the sense of being bodies out of 
place,34 not really the right people to occupy 
these shoes. Women’s voices are pitched too 
high, their clothes look wrong, they are too 
short to carry authority. “There are more risks”, 
as one woman MP said in an interview in 2010, 
“because if your voice becomes shrill, you will 
immediately become ridiculed.”35 Many report 
the feeling of being an intruder into someone 
else’s territory, and this can make it harder to 
take the initiative in challenging agendas or 
querying existing procedures. Some relish the 
challenge, but others report feeling silenced by 
it. The intruders into spaces previously reserved 
for others carry what Nirmal Puwar terms the 
“burden of doubt” (are they really up to the 
job?) and the “burden of representation” (if 
they fail in something, this will be taken as 
confirmation that their entire sex or entire ethnic 
group is lacking).36  
Improving the gender composition helps 
challenge the more overt sexism, but may not 
be enough, on its own, when dealing with 
seemingly gender-neutral norms. We have 
already noted one way these can work to 
disadvantage women: that politicians deciding 
whom to favour for leadership positions are 
inclined to discount those whose political career 
began later, or who have a background in school 
education: discount, that is, the paths more 
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typically taken by women than men. In politics 
(as in the legal profession and the media and 
cultural industries), what is taken as evidence 
of ability or commitment is shaped by a history 
in which those being compared and considered 
have for a long time been predominantly 
men. This establishes certain work-life balance 
norms: an expectation, for example, that one 
demonstrates one’s commitment by remaining 
late into the evening for committee meetings 
or debates; or a hierarchy of qualities that 
rates the capacity for cut and thrust in the 
debating chamber (the very terminology 
speaks to masculinity) over what are felt to be 
the more pedestrian capacities of the good 
constituency MP. Seemingly neutral practices 
about when meetings are held provide one of 
the most familiar examples, for these work to 
disadvantage those who have young children or, 
more precisely, to disadvantage those who have 
young children and assume responsibility for 
them. Meeting times are almost always a source 
of debate when the gender composition of an 
organisation changes, for in any setting where 
the proportion of women with young children 
increases, questions begin to be asked about 
why meetings have to be held so late in the 
day. Often, however, the questions are raised 
and business as usual resumes. Politics remains 
profoundly gendered, in ways that continue to 
advantage men. 
The same can be said of the Civil Service, which 
is where so much of the detailed work of 
generating policy takes place. More than half of 
civil servants – 53 per cent – are women, but the 
proportion in senior posts (the posts with most 
impact on policy formation) is significantly less. In 
2014, only 31.4 per cent of senior civil servants 
were women, and only 22 per cent of Permanent 
Secretaries. Only the Education Department 
had a substantial number of senior women; 
elsewhere men predominated, especially in the 
Ministries of Defence, Justice, and the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. An independent 
report commissioned to identify the obstacles 
blocking women’s progress uncovered damning 
evidence of what one respondent described as a 
“hideous macho culture at the top”, and many 
as a “bear-pit”.37 Women, it seems, often decide 
not to apply for senior positions. One described 
her experience thus: “I did apply for a job at a 
senior grade and was told afterwards by the DG 
that I did not get an interview because I would 
have performed better than preferred candidate 
– it was his turn for promotion ... I have not 
applied for anything since.”38  Significantly, the 
men surveyed for this report were more likely 
than the women to think that discrimination 
was a thing of the past, while the women were 
noticeably more sceptical about the availability 
of equal opportunities, the fairness of promotion 
decisions, and the commitment of the Civil 
Service to diversity.  
There is some evidence that new institutions 
provide a more favourable climate in which to 
challenge the power of gendered norms. It is 
notable, for example, that post-conflict societies 
often adopt effective mechanisms to address 
the gender composition of their legislative 
assemblies, with the result that it is countries 
like Rwanda or South Africa that now take the 
lead in global league tables for the proportion 
of women in politics.39 But here too there is no 
guarantee of an upward curve, and the Scottish 
Parliament again provides a useful illustration. 
The designers of the new institution were keen to 
demonstrate their distance from the Westminster 
parliamentary model, and gender politics initially 
played a significant role in this. “The inclusion of 
women and the promotion of gender equality 
came to be seen as emblematic of a wider 
aspiration for ‘new politics’ in Scotland: a more 
positive politics departing from the zero-sum 
games of the ‘Westminster model’.”40 The four 
founding principles, laid out by the Consultative 
Steering Group, were access and participation, 
equal opportunities, accountability, and power- 
sharing. These translated, among other things, 
into a more proportionate electoral system, 
a parliamentary time-table that fitted within 
school term times, and gender-responsive 
budgeting. From interviews conducted in 2010, 
it seems that the Scottish Parliament is indeed 
perceived as more welcoming to women, as 
less macho, more inclusionary, and an easier 
place than Westminster in which to get up and 
speak.41 But the new is “nested” within the 
old, and old habits die hard. The new norms, 
for example, favoured collaboration over 
competition, but within a short time, political 
leaders “remembered” the adversarial practice 
of Prime Minister’s Questions and adopted it 
for the Scottish Parliament as First Minister’s 
Questions. The new norms also established equal 
opportunities as a founding principle, but only 
four years into the life of the Parliament this 
was “forgotten”, when a review of procedures 
simply omitted to mention it as a key principle.42 
As Fiona Mackay concludes, “the stickiness – 
and authority – of old rules and norms…and 
the nestedness of new institutions within the 
wider environment, including gender regimes 
and gender dynamics, provides a powerful 
explanation for why it seems so hard to  
make stick reforms conducive to the gendering  
of politics.”43
Ways Forward
In Feminizing Politics, Joni Lovenduski identifies 
three equality strategies, what she calls equality 
rhetoric, equality promotion, and equality 
guarantees.44 The first expresses a commitment, 
but without much more in the form of practical 
reform. The second works to remove obstacles 
to women’s greater participation: for example, 
by reforming working hours in parliament and 
local councils, monitoring and encouraging 
potential women candidates, and ensuring 
that selectorates get better training in equal 
opportunities. The third typically involves 
gender quotas, either introduced voluntarily by 
individual political parties, or imposed through 
legislation that requires all parties to comply. 
Experience indicates that promotion works 
slowly, and that guarantees are necessary for 
significant change. Equality guarantees have 
been adopted to good effect in over half the 
countries of the world, though these rarely 
require 50/50 equality, and more commonly 
establish a threshold minimum of 25 per 
cent, 30 per cent or 40 per cent.45 The more 
prescriptive legislative quotas are increasingly 
adopted in other parts of Europe, including in 
France, Spain, and Portugal;46  and Ireland has 
recently passed a gender equality law requiring 
parties contesting the next general election 
to ensure that at least 30 per cent of their 
candidates are women, a figure rising to 40 per 
cent over the following seven years.47  
Critics of quota policies sometimes represent 
them as selecting people on the grounds of 
gender rather than merit, but this does not 
stand up to close scrutiny. First, it is implausible 
to think that selecting an overwhelming majority 
of male candidates reflects nothing but their 
intrinsic merit, and owes nothing to dominant 
gender norms. One might more plausibly claim 
that these candidates have benefitted from an 
implicit gender quota for men. Second, there is 
little evidence to suggest that those who now 
benefit from explicit quotas for women are less 
qualified than their non-quota counterparts. A 
study of the women selected from the Labour 
Party’s all-women short lists in 1997 indicates 
virtually no difference between “quota” and 
“non-quota” MPs: in fact, the one slight 
difference was that quota MPs were closer to 
their male colleagues in terms of whether they 
had previously contested elections, or been local 
councillors, than women chosen from non-
quota lists.48 There is also some evidence that 
quotas for women can improve the quality of 
male candidates. Data on candidates in Swedish 
municipalities over the course of seven elections 
suggest that the “zipper quota” employed by 
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the Social Democratic Party actually raised the 
calibre of male politicians, making it harder for 
“mediocre men” to be elected.49  
The electoral system for the UK Parliament 
does not lend itself to a zipper quota. It 
does, however, lend itself to the twinning of 
constituencies, and to the use of all-women 
shortlists. The Sex Discrimination (Election 
Candidates) Act, passed in 2002 with a sunset 
clause but now extended till 2030, makes it 
legal to use positive action, including quotas, to 
correct the under-representation of women in 
politics. Only the Labour Party and Green Party 
have so far made use of the provision, and no 
party currently supports mandatory quotas. A 
wide range of equality promotion measures was 
recently proposed in the Report of the Speakers 
Conference on Parliamentary Representation, 
set up to address the under-representation of  
women, ethnic minorities, and disabled people 
in the House of Commons (the conference later 
added sexuality). The Report also endorsed, 
at least in principle, the idea of an equality 
guarantee.50 Should nothing improve in the 
2010 election, the Report suggested that  
“Parliament should give serious consideration to 
the introduction of prescriptive quotas, ensuring 
that all political parties adopt some form of 
equality guarantee in time for the following 
general election”. The largely hostile press 
reaction to this last recommendation does not 
promise well for the introduction of legislative 
quotas, and Sarah Childs, one of the advisors 
to the conference, suggests that “against this 
unfavourable background…advocates of gender 
equality might do well to consider a “turn” to 
party regulation other than legislative sex quotas 
as an alternative and hitherto under-utilised 
strategy for achieving women’s greater political 
representation in the UK parliament”.51 
Recommendations
Nearly a century after women won the right 
to vote and stand for parliament, the position 
of women in British politics remains highly 
unsatisfactory. Despite recent improvements, 
women are very much a minority in all the 
country’s elected bodies. Informal rules and 
hidden assumptions continue to block sustained 
transformation of politics and policies. Women 
active in politics are still “over-gendered” 
(treated as if their gender is their most salient 
characteristic), while the policies adopted by 
parties and governments  are “under-gendered” 
(pursued without serious attention to their 
impact on gender equality). In the light of 
the failure to implement frequent claims of 
commitment to equality, we recommend:
1.  Quotas
We recommend that political parties 
introduce or reintroduce minimum quotas for 
women for all internal positions. The use of 
gender quotas for internal positions ensures that 
men and women alike gain political experience 
and are able to contribute to policy formation. 
Though any kind of quota can, on occasion, 
be cumbersome or feel overly mechanical, the 
evidence suggests that this is the only way to 
ensure that questions of equality and diversity are 
taken seriously within a party. Quotas help make 
questions of inclusion and exclusion more visible, 
and widen awareness of the issues that need to 
be addressed in policy development. 
2.  Gender parity in government 
We recommend that political parties 
commit themselves to principles of gender 
parity (50/50) in the formation of future 
governments. This is an area where governments 
have the power to effect rapid change. There is 
no need to wait for the proportion of women 
in a parliament or assembly to reach 50 per 
cent before introducing parity in the selection 
of ministers; as several governments around the 
world have already established, this can be done 
as soon as there is the necessary political will. A 
requirement to appoint equal numbers of women 
and men helps challenge what is sometimes an 
inappropriate reliance on friendship networks and 
encourages more imaginative appointments.
3.   Achieving work-life balance in  
political work 
We recommend that Parliaments, Assemblies, 
and Councils be made more responsive to 
members’ family and care responsibilities, 
including through the implementation of 
parental leave in line with best public sector 
practice, and the revision of working hours 
and voting mechanisms. We have challenged 
the view that “supply-side” issues explain the 
under-representation of women, but this is not to 
understate the difficulties posed to anyone who 
has significant care responsibilities and yet wants 
to pursue a political career. Reforms already 
introduced in some of these bodies include on-
site nurseries, arranging sessions around school 
terms, allocating voting times in advance, and 
there is plenty of good practice to draw on here. 
Less has so far been done as regards parental 
leave arrangements, the overall length of the 
working day, or the possibility of job sharing 
for politicians. If we are to make our decision 
making assemblies more genuinely representative 
of the diversity of the electorate, we need more 
imaginative thinking about this. 
4.   Regulate political parties on  
gender equality
We recommend that parliament introduce 
a robust system of party regulation, with 
strong equality and diversity provision. Current 
regulation of political parties is almost entirely 
focused on sources of party funding and the 
conduct of election campaigns, but there is no 
reason why parties should not also be required 
to monitor their gender and ethnic composition, 
demonstrate that they have effective mechanisms 
in place to achieve a gender balance, and carry 
out gender audits of their policies. The Speaker’s 
Conference recommended that all parties 
should collect and publish data on their MPs, 
33
councillors, and candidates, broken down by 
gender, ethnicity, and disability, but so far this 
has been left to the parties to carry out on a 
voluntary basis. This means that some do – but 
not others. This kind of data collection should 
be a mandatory requirement, as important as 
collecting and publishing data on sources of 
party funding, and should be combined with a 
requirement to adopt and publish action plans 
setting out how they propose to diversify those 
elected as representatives of their party, including 
by gender. 
5.  Gender auditing 
We recommend that governments be 
required to carry out serious gender audits 
of all the policies they propose to introduce. 
Like everything in politics, gender audits provide 
no guarantee: they can easily degenerate into 
a “tick-box” approach, and when carried out 
by people who have no vested interest in their 
outcomes, often do so. That said, the key point 
about gender audits is that they require politicians 
and policy makers to address explicitly the likely 
impact of a policy on women and men, and to 
demonstrate that they have taken into account 
– and justified – whether the opportunities 
and burdens will be distributed differentially 
between the sexes. Given that so much of what 
sustains power inequalities are the unspoken 
assumptions, hidden principles, and taken-for-
granted parameters with which policy is currently 
made, requiring our political representatives to 
think consciously about the gender impact of their 
initiatives opens up the space for what researchers 
call a “re-gendering” of politics and policy.
6.   Quotas for women selected to stand  
for Parliament 
We recommend that Parliament pass 
legislation establishing a ceiling gender 
quota for the MPs for each political party: a 
maximum 70 per cent of either sex at the first 
general election following the legislation, 
moving to a maximum 60 per cent of either 
sex at the following one, along the lines of 
the recent legislation in Ireland. This is the 
most controversial of our recommendations 
because it involves a mandatory quota on 
political parties in their selection of candidates 
for election. It is, however, increasingly the 
practice across Europe, including now in Ireland, 
and reflects frustration with the history of 
failed promises and insincere commitments by 
parties that do not yet regard the homogeneity 
of their representatives as a serious concern. 
Current improvements in gender balance are 
almost entirely due to those parties that have 
chosen, voluntarily, to act on this issue, but 
this leaves the gender imbalance in the other 
parties relatively untouched. Our framing of the 
recommendation as a ceiling rather than a floor 
reflects the strongly held views of contributors 
to the Commission that the burden of the 
argument should now shift from the under-
representation of women to the unjustifiable 
over-representation of men. 
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In opening this section of 
our report, it is important to 
acknowledge that the operation 
and significance of the law 
in shaping, reflecting and 
combatting gender inequality 
has to be assessed by reference 
to the role which the economy, 
the political system, cultural 
forces and the media play in 
determining the distribution 
of power and the range and, 
particularly, real worth of 
rights. In addition, law’s 
capacity effectively to address 
conflicts arising from issues of 
work-life balance and gender-
based violence or violence 
against women and girls is 
in large part premised on the 
political, economic and cultural 
environment which shapes the 
content and symbolic effects 
of law. This environment is 
influenced by both lawyers’ and 
lay people’s interpretations 
of law, and by patterns, as 
well as the impact, of law’s 
implementation and enforcement. 
Nonetheless, legal rules, ideas, 
and institutional arrangements 
are of sufficient independent 
importance to call for separate 
consideration. The scope of 
law is, however, far too broad 
to make it possible to aim for a 
comprehensive analysis. Rather, 
in what follows we concentrate 
on a number of key areas which 
have a particular importance for 
gender, inequality and power. 
LAW
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The long road to formal gender  
equality in law
Any evaluation of the adequacy with which 
the law deals with women – both as subjects 
of legal rights, duties and regulations, and 
as members of the legal profession – must 
be put in a historical context. A raft of legal 
disqualifications which expressed and formalised 
women’s inferior civic status were the object 
of critique in Britain from at least the late 17th 
Century,1 accelerating with key contributions 
such as Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of 
the Rights of Women2 and John Stuart Mill’s 
and Harriet Taylor’s The Subjection of Women3  
in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries. But 
law reform was slow to follow, and the real 
challenges to the legal status quo began in the 
latter part of the 19th Century, with gradual 
changes to family law and suffrage, and with 
married women achieving basic control of their 
property in 1882.4  
The social changes engendered by the First 
World War provided a further impetus, not 
least through the activities of the suffrage 
movements: women achieved something 
approaching equal rights in divorce in 1923,5  
though it was not until 1928 that women 
finally won an equal say in electing lawmakers.6  
The first women solicitors and barristers were 
admitted to the legal profession only slightly 
before this, in the early 1920s, following the 
passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) 
Act 1919. Further legislative landmarks were 
slow in coming: the Equal Pay Act arrived in 
1970, but was not implemented until the UK’s 
accession to the European Community.7  
The pace of legal change then speeded up, with 
the Sex Discrimination Act following in 1975, 
and a range of further developments extending 
the concept of equal pay and sex discrimination 
issuing from EU directives.8 These included the 
introduction of the concept of equal pay for 
work of equal value in 1983 and ratification 
of the UN Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) in 1986.9 The Human Rights Act 2000 
entrenched the European Convention’s principle 
that all Convention rights should be guaranteed 
equally irrespective of sex; and in 2010, a 
composite Equality Act brought together the 
legal frameworks addressing discrimination 
on the grounds of sex10 with other prohibited 
grounds of discrimination including race, 
religion, marital status, pregnancy, age and 
disability. With formal barriers to the profession 
a thing of the past, and formal gender equality 
securely entrenched in legal norms, one 
might have expected that a centuries-long 
revolution had been completed: that the law 
had unambiguously become a tool for the 
advancement of gender equality, and the  
legal profession a place of genuinely  
equal opportunities.
Continuing discrimination despite  
formal legal equality
Unfortunately, facts and figures suggest 
otherwise. Certainly, some large gains have 
been made. None of us would want to turn the 
clock back, and this is a salutary reminder that 
real legal change is possible, and that ideals of 
equality can be incorporated in law.12 But much 
remains to be done. 
Looking first at the legal profession: In part as a 
result of growing numbers of women completing 
higher education, women admitted as solicitors 
rose nearly tenfold, from 6 per cent to 57 per 
cent, between 1970 and 2005,13 while women 
called to the Bar rose from a mere handful in 
1970 to just under 50 per cent by 2010,14 with 
the most dramatic increase coming, in each case, 
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s.15  
But when we look at earnings, at career 
progression, and at the higher echelons of 
the profession, the picture is rather different. 
The gender pay gap among solicitors remains 
around 30 per cent, with women at the top 
of the profession earning around £50,000 
per year less than their male counterparts,16 
and male associate solicitors ten times more 
likely to become partners than their female 
counterparts.17 Only 17 per cent of equity 
partners in the UK are women – and this figure 
is yet lower at the most prestigious firms.18 At 
the Bar, following the appointment of the first 
woman QC in the early 1970s, women had 
made their way to constituting only just over 10 
per cent by 2010.19 The new, supposedly equal-
opportunities oriented system of appointment 
introduced in 2005, has apparently made very 
little difference to the rate of progress.20 
 
Outcomes in the appointment of judges reflect 
a similarly hierarchical pattern. From nowhere 
in 1975, women had made their way by 2014 
to 27.9 per cent of district judges in the County 
Courts and 31 per cent 21  of district judges in 
Magistrates’ Courts.22 However, only 20.5 per 
cent of Circuit Court Judges are women.23 In the 
High Court, a mere 17.9 per cent are women 
(21 women out of 108 judges),24 and 18.4 per 
cent of Court of Appeal judges are women (8 
women out of 38 judges). The single woman 
appointed to the Supreme Court in 1998 
remains there in apparently intractable isolation, 
with the fourteen appointments made since 
1998 all middle class white men.25  
The UK has never sent a woman judge to key 
international tribunals such as the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) or the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), and has only sent one 
woman to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). Progression to the higher judiciary from 
the lower Courts, where women are better 
represented, remains difficult. The evidence 
Figure 1 Millicent Fawcett addresses a rally in Hyde Park, 191311
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which we heard was to the effect that, despite 
a number of initiatives over the last thirty 
years, such as the establishment of a Judicial 
Appointments Commission in 2006,26 things 
have not changed to anything like the degree 
one might have hoped, with criteria of merit 
strongly shaped by a traditional vision of 
necessary skills and forms of work organisation 
shaped by and for privileged men.27 The 
prevailing estimate is that we will have to wait 
something approaching another half century for 
equality in the senior judiciary.28  
A similar contrast between articulated, formally 
equal legal policy and substantive outcome 
characterises a number of areas of relevant legal 
regulation. Elaborate equal pay laws sit side by 
side with continuing and substantial differences 
in average male and female earnings, as 
documented in our Economics section. Judging 
by both research and anecdotal evidence from 
relevant bodies such as trades unions, pressure 
groups and private consultancies,30 a legal 
norm of non-discrimination on grounds of sex, 
pregnancy/maternity or marital status turns out 
to be perfectly consistent with continuing sex 
discrimination.31 This is true even in the areas 
– employment, housing, the provision of public 
Appointment Title Male Female % Female
Heads of Division 5 0 0.0%
Lords Justices of Appeal 31 7 18.4%
High Court Judges 87 19 17.9%
Judge Advocates 7 1 12.5%
Deputy Judge Advocates 3 1 25.0%
Masters, Registrars, Costs Judges and District Judges 
(Principal Registry of the Family Division)
28 11 28.2%
Deputy Masters, Deputy Registrars, Deputy Costs Judges 
and Deputy District Judges (PRFD)
37 23 38.3%
Circuit Judges 509 131 20.5%
Recorders 940 186 16.5%
District Judges (Country Courts) 316 122 27.9%
Deputy District Judges (County Courts) 460 261 36.2%
District Judges (Magistrates’ Courts) 98 44 31.0%
Deputy District Judges (Magistrates’ Courts) 86 39 31.2%
Total 2,607 845 24.4%
goods and services – to which the legislation 
applies.  Higher rates of part time work among 
women (42 per cent of women, as compared 
with just 12 per cent of men)32 mean that women 
are more likely than men to be in jobs which do 
not attract full employment protections, while 
the gendered composition of “non-standard” 
work intersects with the tax benefits regime to 
further disadvantage women.33 In 2012, of the 2 
million employees earning below the threshold 
for national insurance – and hence ineligible 
for contributory benefits such as a retirement 
pension, statutory sick pay, holidays and 
maternity pay – three quarters were women.34 
It goes without saying that the impact of these 
factors is considerably aggravated by the current 
climate of economic austerity, as discussed in our 
analysis of the economy.
Successive legal initiatives on violence against 
women and children – rape, sexual abuse and 
domestic violence – have left alarmingly high 
levels of these social phenomena in place. For 
example, around one in 20 women between the 
ages of 16 and 59 report having been the victim 
of rape or sexual assault, rising to one in five if 
we include less serious forms of sexual assault.35 
In addition, even when instances of domestic 
Table 1 Judicial Diversity statistics (2014, partial)29 
violence are reported, there are reasons to think 
that practices that cap the number of incidents 
recorded in relation to any one case significantly 
under-represent the true scale of the domestic 
violence.36  
Improvements in police and prosecution 
handling of sexual assault cases and treatment 
of victims, though real, are very much a work 
in progress. It is estimated that only about 15 
per cent of those experiencing the most serious 
forms of sexual violence report it to the police, 
and as we know from some widely publicised 
recent cases, sceptical or unsympathetic 
responses to allegations of sexual assault or 
harassment – on the part not only of the police 
but also employers, universities and other 
organisations – are not uncommon.37 Practices 
such as female genital mutilation remain 
apparently impervious to legal regulation.38 
In spite of their commitment to enhancing 
women’s autonomy post-divorce and freedom 
to exit abusive or unhappy marriages, family 
law reforms have not fundamentally changed 
the economic and child-care dynamics of family 
life, with ex-wives substantially more likely to 
experience a major decline in their financial 
position post-divorce than ex-husbands. And, 
as we have already seen, rates of female and 
child poverty remain disproportionately high.39 
This will read as an unduly stark summary and 
may not reflect a nuanced analysis. But it is, 
substantially, true.
Why should this be the case? The evidence 
which we have heard, along with a wide range 
of scholarship and reports by expert bodies, 
point to five broad concerns. These have to do 
with the way in which the law thinks about 
and defines women and gender relations, this 
shaping in turn the law’s capacity to be effective 
as an agent of change; with questions about the 
law’s scope; with difficulties of implementation, 
enforcement and access to justice; and, last but 
certainly not least, with the social, economic and 
political context in which law reform and legal 
practice take place.  
Sources of continuing gender 
inequality in law
Content: how the law thinks about 
women and men
First, we have to look at the content of the law, 
asking whether the law truly lives up to its own 
aspiration to achieve genuine gender impartiality 
and fairness in the articulation of its provisions. 
Failures of impartiality in the content of the law 
are easiest to identify in systems where formal 
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equality has not yet been achieved. To take 
one example in relatively recent English law: 
before the reforms introduced by the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, the law of rape provided, in 
effect, that a man who had sex with a woman 
without her consent, believing that she was 
consenting, had to be acquitted even if he had 
no reasonable grounds for that belief – hence 
arguably inscribing his point of view, rather than 
the woman’s, within the law.40  
Such examples remain common in some 
jurisdictions.  As one of our panellists argued in 
her discussion of a recent case in the Republic 
of Ireland, jurisdictions which restrict access to 
abortion or which prioritise the life of a foetus 
(in the case discussed, to the extent of keeping 
a brain dead woman on life support in extremely 
distressing circumstances, even though there 
was no chance of her foetus’s ultimate survival), 
disclose a failure to accord equal value to 
women’s bodily integrity and dignity.41 But even 
where the law is facially neutral and formally 
equal, legal rules can disadvantage women, and 
gendered assumptions shape legal interpretation. 
A good example is the operation of criminal 
law in the context of domestic violence. The 
requirement that a defensive reaction, to qualify 
as a legal defence, must follow immediately upon 
a threat of violence, disadvantages the physically 
less powerful.  Feminists have also shown that 
the tendency to interpret women’s violence in 
the “pathological” terms of mental incapacity 
defences rather than as fully or partially justifiable 
loss of control or self-defence.42 
Indeed, the law in some real sense constitutes 
(or disqualifies) gendered, trans-gendered and 
sexed identities by defining, albeit implicitly, the 
qualifications for claiming and exercising legal 
rights. In many contexts, law subtly operates on 
the assumption that a “normal” legal subject has 
characteristics associated with white, middle class 
heterosexual men: someone who works full time, 
does not take career breaks, does not sustain 
caring relationships which affect his capacity for 
earning and his (paid) working hours, and initiates 
rather than “consents to” sex.43 The marginalising 
power of these unstated norms, moreover, is 
magnified where “differences” of gender intersect 
with those of ethnicity, socio-economic advantage, 
religion, sexuality.44 In this context, formally equal 
rights may turn out to be of significantly less worth 
to certain groups. A good example would be the 
basic right to freedom of expression, which is 
arguably reduced for women by the pervasiveness 
of forms of pornographic and abusive expression 
which subtly change or disqualify the meaning of 
women’s speech.45 
This first point about how the law “thinks” 
about its subjects applies with particular force 
to the law’s construction of working life. An 
excellent example is the legal profession itself. 
Here, we need to ask whether the conditions of 
work, the prevailing assumptions about merit, 
and about “normal” career progression, are 
framed with a person with no dependents, no 
need for maternity/parental leave – hence, more 
likely, a man – in mind.46 Note too that the law’s 
implicit full time worker norm implies significant, 
and significantly gendered, work-life conflict 
costs for workers with caring responsibilities.47  
It is often observed that the legal or other 
professions suffer from a problem of “attrition” 
at successive levels of seniority. But this 
description arguably gives too much emphasis to 
“supply side” issues, at the expense of thinking 
about the demand side. While, certainly, the 
figures do reflect choices made by women 
lawyers, they also reflect the conditions under 
which those choices are made. And these 
conditions include both structural barriers (for 
example, a culture of long working hours and 
the timing of partnership decision-making at 
time many women lawyers are having family) 
and cultural barriers (for example gender 
stereotypes in which women are still seen as 
the primary caregivers to children and ageing 
family members and men as breadwinners). 
At least some of these conditions could be 
adapted by the profession – which probably 
finds the “attrition” of women convenient in 
the management of career progression more 
generally – so as to diversify the patterns of 
career progression which are possible.48 And 
while women’s lack of progress in the legal 
profession may seem a relatively small issue 
as compared with the growing problems of 
precarious employment and poverty which afflict 
many women, progress towards a more diverse 
legal profession is arguably key to maximising 
the law’s potential to fully represent and serve all 
of its subjects.49 
Law’s limited scope
Second, we have to bear in mind that, in many 
relevant areas, the law may be adequate so 
far as it goes, but inadequate in failing to 
address certain key issues for women because 
of its limited scope. A good example here 
would be the limited ambit of the Equality 
Act’s anti-discrimination norms which, as one 
of our panellists put it, “fail to reach many 
of the areas of life which most affect women 
as women”.51 Quite generally, our social 
attachment to the idea that there are limits to 
how far law should reach into areas of private 
or family regulation – limits which we observe 
irregularly, yet which still exert a great deal of 
cultural force – circumscribes the impact of legal 
rules in areas like employment regulation. This 
is because patterns of behaviour within the 
family – notably the distribution of domestic and 
caring work – affect labour market behaviour 
and opportunities in ways which continue to be 
strongly gendered.52  
For example, as mentioned in our Economics 
section, although women’s and men’s pay is 
now relatively equal up to the age of 30, it 
diverges markedly from that point on, clearly 
reflecting the differential force of maternity 
and parenting obligations.53 Several of those 
giving evidence to the Commission emphasised 
the fact that, where the law does not reach, 
its silence implicitly legitimises the status quo, 
and as a result consolidates existing gender 
power relations. In a world in which gender 
and other forms of discrimination, as well as 
gender-based violence, are widespread, an anti-
discrimination norm, and indeed legal measures 
more generally, carry the risk of perversely 
representing discrimination as exceptional, 
hence subtly adding to problems of both proof 
and identification of the issue. Conversely, 
it is worth bearing in mind that some of the 
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legal changes with the greatest impact on, or 
potential to reduce, gender inequality are not 
gender-specific on their face. Prime examples 
include the minimum wage legislation and 
the proposed enactment of a living wage 
requirement.
Problems of implementation  
and enforcement
Third, we must accept that, even where legal 
rules and provisions themselves appear to 
approximate to basic standards of impartiality 
and gender equity, implementation and 
enforcement are key.  These involve a range of 
institutions and actors – courts, police officers, 
regulators, prosecutors, and indeed the lay 
people who invoke the law – whose incentives 
and values need to be considered.54 In addition, 
access to legal advice and enforcement is hugely 
uneven along not only gender but also ethnic 
and socio-economic lines, and is becoming 
markedly more so with current cuts in legal 
aid, notably as a result of the Legal Aid and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO).55  
To take some examples: legal reform of sexual 
offences is bound to have a limited impact if 
the key gatekeepers between a rape and its 
successful prosecution are not well informed 
about, and sympathetic to, the principles 
underlying the law. So the attitudes of police 
officers, prosecutors, lawyers, judges, police 
doctors and indeed jurors are of central 
importance.56 This is vividly illustrated by recent 
instances – the Rochdale sex abuse cases 
for example – in which reviews and decisive 
policy initiatives by bodies such as the Crown 
Prosecution Service have led to real changes 
in implementation without any formal change 
in the law.57 Victims of both sexual offences 
and domestic violence are unlikely to be 
willing to see through, or possibly even to 
make, complaints which are likely to lead to 
burdensome and distressing legal proceedings, 
which may concern their partner or another 
person they know well, unless they encounter 
support from the police. They also need to have 
genuine access to effective legal advice, and 
in some cases access to social supports such 
as alternative safe accommodation.58 Another 
telling indicator here is that there has been only 
one – unsuccessful – prosecution under the 
legislation  prohibiting female genital mutilation 
since its introduction in 1985.60 
Even some of the most potentially equality-
promoting provisions existing in English law 
remain under- or un-enforced. The duty to 
advance equality imposed on public sector 
organisations by the Equality Act 2010 has 
resulted in a relatively modest 135 cases up 
to the end of 2014, with only two of them 
producing a successful outcome in terms of 
gender equality.61 The section 78 provision for 
regulations mandating the provision of data 
on gender pay gaps by firms employing 250 
or more staff remains un-used.62 And although 
the Equality Act makes quite generous provision 
for positive action to advance gender equality 
outside the workplace, this legal possibility is 
not exploited nearly as much as it might be, 
because the idea that legal anti-discrimination 
norms prohibit positive action continues to exert 
great influence.63 Despite the UK’s ratification of 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW),64 and the courts’ 
occasional reliance on it in interpreting the 
Human Rights Act, no use has been made of 
Article 4’s provision that “the adoption of … 
special measures aimed at accelerating de facto 
equality between men and women shall not be 
discrimination”.65 And individual rights pertaining 
to divorce, financial support and child custody 
post-divorce are of little value except to the 
wealthy if access to justice is undermined by the 
removal of legal aid.66 
Here, evidently, public spending cuts and 
market pressures have become a key barrier to 
the advancement of gender equality through 
law.67 Indeed many of those participating in 
our hearings pointed to the growing extent to 
which pure market considerations shape the 
conduct of social life, with the commodification 
of legal services (including court services, 
for which high charges are now made in 
many contexts) skewing access to justice. In 
addition, particularly on the solicitors’ side of 
the profession, the commercial interests of 
firms increasingly shape the organisation of 
work, with important implications for not only 
work-life balance but also the career progression 
of women or indeed of men shouldering 
substantial caring responsibilities for children 
or other dependent family members.68 Radical 
cuts in legal aid have undermined the ideal of 
justice as a public good, while the imposition of 
substantial fees for tribunal hearings and judicial 
review are making access to justice illusory 
for large swathes of the population, with a 
particular impact on women given their unequal 
financial position.69  
The impact of this accelerated privatisation 
of legal services has been aggravated by the 
concomitant decline in forms of collective 
provision of legal advice and support such as 
trade unions, law centres and citizens’ advice 
bureaux, leaving many potential litigants 
dependent on either their own resources or the 
support of charitable organisations such as the 
Personal Support Unit.70 This structural change 
poses longer term risks to the quality of justice.  
For example, there is already evidence of severe 
delays in the family courts as a result of the 
withdrawal of legal aid from civil cases, leading 
to many unrepresented litigants unfamiliar 
with court processes.71 And there is real anxiety 
about the future supply of criminal law advice to 
defendants given the severe financial impact of 
legal aid changes on solicitors’ firms specialising 
in criminal defence.72 
This question about access to justice – about 
how it is premised on power, and how it 
affects the worth of rights to different groups 
– illuminates the significance of two further 
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issues: that of intersectionality – the ways in 
which intersecting differences can magnify 
the effects of discrimination; and that of legal 
pluralism – can access to alternative legal orders 
or mechanisms of dispute resolution provide 
adequate alternatives to public justice? Several 
of those who gave evidence emphasised the 
particularly stark way in which certain groups of 
women – those unlawfully present in the UK, 
or unsure of their immigration status; victims 
of domestic abuse; victims of trafficking; those 
without high levels of confidence in English – 
are excluded from any form of legal recourse.73 
For them, the promise of equality before the law 
is illusory. The impact of these intersecting axes 
of inequality is often magnified by the operation 
of implicit norms about what counts as 
“standard” forms of victimisation. For example, 
physical violence is taken more seriously than 
forms of psychological, domestic, economic 
or sexual violence which do not cause injury: 
indeed serious physical injury is now a condition 
for legal aid in family matters.74
Can access to alternative legal orders or forms 
of dispute resolution complement, or substitute 
for, access to public justice? There is a substantial 
amount of empirical research on mediation and 
other forms of conflict resolution, much of which 
points to the danger that, without adequate 
representation or support, such arrangements 
tend to consolidate inequalities by giving an 
advantage to the more powerful party.75 So a 
general move towards informal justice is worrying 
from the point of view of gender equality. But, in 
light of some of the difficulties of formal justice 
itself in accommodating difference, might there 
not be some advantages, in terms of power or 
autonomy, in promoting access to alternative legal 
orders representing the interests and aspirations of 
particular religious or other groups?76  
This is a highly topical question in light of 
recent debates about both Jewish and Muslim 
courts’ jurisdiction over a range of, notably 
family, matters, in which the relevant norms 
of Jewish or Islamic law do not accord equal 
access to divorce or equal rights to marital 
property to women.77 Access to the rabbinical 
court (Beth Din), the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal 
or to  Shar’iah Councils aims to enhance 
Jews’ or Muslims’ autonomy to settle disputes 
in accordance with their cultural and religious 
commitments.  But a real concern with women’s 
equality requires that the demands of cultural 
pluralism must be interpreted consistently 
with women’s rights as understood in Equality 
legislation.78 Should the state legal system 
recognise the rulings of these alternative legal 
institutions, accepting them as evidence or even 
giving effect to them? As things stand, the broad 
position is that such jurisdictions cannot oust 
state law’s jurisdiction for anyone who seeks it.79 
But given the problems of unequal access to 
justice already canvassed, this hardly addresses 
the issue. Hence others see policies designed to 
empower women within these communities as a 
more just and effective way forward.80 
The limited effectiveness of legal solutions
Fourth, we have to look carefully at whether a 
legal solution – and in particular criminal law 
solution such as the Female Genital Mutilation 
Act 2003 or the recent Modern Slavery Act 
2015  –  is genuinely the best way of tackling 
gender inequality or injustice in any given instance. 
For instance, while it may be tempting to demand 
that our legislature react to injustices such as 
female genital mutilation, domestic violence or 
trafficking of women or children by prohibiting 
these activities or by increasing the sanctions 
already attached to them, we also need to be 
aware that legal proscriptions can sometimes 
work against the interests of the very people they 
are aiming to help. For example, such laws may 
make the victims of trafficking more vulnerable 
by defining them as parties to criminal activity, 
by identifying their immigration status or by 
increasing the incentives of those exploiting them 
to keep their activities well out of public view.81  
In addition, while rights are of huge importance 
in the struggle for gender justice, they are in 
some ways a limited tool for the pursuit of 
gender equality. For, even leaving aside issues of 
enforcement and the unequal worth of rights, in 
English law, most of the relevant rights pertain 
to individuals, and advance individual claims.  So 
the broader, collective upshot of individual rights 
enforcement is contingent on the facts of particular 
cases.  Certainly, a single case can sometimes have 
wide knock-on effects.  And legal proceedings 
can on occasion provide a platform for group or 
collective interests – some equal pay cases, and 
class actions, are two examples. But very often, the 
assertion of rights will have an impact primarily or 
exclusively on the individual who asserts the right. 
Moreover individual rights enforcement exhibits 
problems of “legal adversarialism”82 rights can be 
costly to enforce, potentially divisive, uneven in their 
impact, and poorly adapted to address problems of 
structural disadvantage.
The social context in which law operates
Fifth – and perhaps most intractably, because 
this issue arguably underpins several of those 
already mentioned – we have to consider 
the social-cultural, economic and political 
environment in which law operates. Here we 
face a conundrum. On the one hand, we aspire 
to use the law to express and enforce standards 
of gender justice even – perhaps especially 
– where they do not already command such 
support as to be self-enforcing. But on the other 
hand, we know that there are real obstacles to 
effective implementation of law in the absence 
of either wide support or official determination. 
Clearly, the law can sometimes be used as a 
tool in the consolidation of an emerging norm 
which still encounters fierce opposition – the 
introduction of votes for women is a key 
example. But legislation in advance of consensus 
works best when, as in the case of suffrage, 
the implementation of the law is relatively 
straightforward and lies largely in the hands of 
those intended to benefit from it.  This is a very 
different situation from, say, technically complex 
equal pay, discrimination or family law claims, 
access to abortion, or criminal enforcement.
Ways Forward
In the light of this analysis of the opportunities 
for, and challenges to, law’s contribution the fair 
distribution of power and to gender equality, in 
the sense of both outcomes and opportunities, 
we have formulated a number of specific 
recommendations, based on a small number of 
general considerations and principles.
First, our recommendations address how best 
to ensure that the content of law as enacted 
by legislation and interpreted in the courts and 
tribunals pays adequate attention to questions 
of gender justice.
Second, our recommendations address how 
to improve the enforcement of existing laws 
which have the potential to dismantle gender 
inequality or to promote gender equality, 
and conversely with how to reduce the law’s 
contribution to gender inequality or imbalances 
of power because of the uneven or biased way 
in which it is enforced, or left unenforced.  
Third, our recommendations address the 
concern to equalise access to justice, and to 
ensure access to qualitatively equal justice, 
across gender and intersecting axes of social 
disadvantage, notably ethnicity, immigration 
status and socio-economic position.
Finally, our recommendations address the fair 
representation of women in not only the legal 
profession but also other fields of activity, by 
subjecting prevailing conceptions of merit to 
critical scrutiny, arguing that diversity of experience 
and fairness should count as criteria of merit.  
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Our recommendations are framed by the 
recognition that many of the changes we 
propose would require resources, the availability 
of which is dependent on political will; and 
that that political will is itself premised not 
only on the institutional and social factors 
considered in the Politics section, but also 
on the labour market and macro-economic 
conditions considered in  the Economics section 
and the influence of the media and other 
cultural institutions considered in the Media 
section of this Report. While our arguments 
are based primarily on the value of fairness and 
the aspiration to gender equality as a matter of 
social justice, we also see in several areas good 
economic or business arguments for change, 
and we see no inconsistency in appealing to 
both kinds of consideration.83 It is important 
to remember that legal, political, economic 
and media arrangements represent collective 
social choices, and that prevailing patterns of 
legally mandated or permitted inequality are 
not an inevitability. And indeed in most cases, 
we are able to identify existing arrangements, 
or realistic existing proposals, which have real 
potential to effect improvements.84
Recommendations
In light of these real challenges, and of the 
vast range and complexity of laws and legal 
arrangements bearing on gender equality, it is 
hard to fix on a limited number of priorities. But 
we would argue that the following proposals 
and principles should be key to our efforts:
1.   Use equality legislation more effectively 
to improve representation 
We recommended that the scope for positive 
action within existing equality legislation 
be exploited more effectively to improve 
women’s representation in all fields of 
employment and political representation. 
In our view, the legal case for positive action 
has often been dismissed too quickly. In fact, 
there is considerable scope for working within 
the constraints set by the Equality Act’s basic 
anti-discrimination norm. There is an opportunity 
for using protected characteristics, such as sex, 
as tie-breakers in recruitment and promotions 
decision-making where merit is equal. 
The Act can also be used for equality-enhancing 
positive action outside the sphere of employment, 
for example in areas such as service provision. 
Moreover these possibilities might be reinforced 
by the full incorporation of the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women into English law, through 
reliance on the Article 4 provision for special 
measures to dismantle gender inequality. 
While quotas and targets are controversial, 
particularly in highly competitive fields, there 
are existing models on which we can build.  
One is the Labour Party’s successful experiment 
with all-women shortlists, formalised in the Sex 
Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002, 
as mentioned in our Politics section. We also 
welcome the recent adoption of targets for 
women on company boards and at partnership 
level in some law firms.85 We would argue that 
dialogue between government, unions, service 
users and professional bodies about the need 
to raise the targets from 30 per cent should be 
maintained. Targets are particularly important 
because of the impact of achieving a critical mass 
of women in any particular sector is likely to have 
further important knock-on effects. 
2.   Transparency and revised criteria of merit 
in recruitment 
We recommend that criteria of merit be 
subjected to careful re-evaluation across the 
labour market, so as to eliminate implicit 
gender bias and acknowledge the ways in 
which a diverse pool of experience within 
a workplace or area of service delivery 
constitutes one component of quality of 
service; and all employers should be under a 
legal duty to make their criteria of merit and 
promotion transparent. 
Our proposal here builds on detailed evidence 
presented to us by Dr. Laura Hilly in relation 
to one specific example: that of judicial 
appointments.86 This argued that the list of 
qualities and abilities used by the Judicial 
Appointments Commission (JAC) should be 
interpreted so as to acknowledge the importance 
of a breadth of experience to not merely the just 
representation of different groups but specifically 
the quality of justice and hence as an element 
of merit. For the evidence that experience 
shapes decision-making implies that a broadly 
constituted court has greater resources on 
which to draw in adjudicating with due regard 
to gender and other dimensions of equality 
before the law. Hence each appointment should 
be informed by the background experiences of 
the court as currently composed, with a view to 
expanding upon the experiential pool. In many 
instances, including the procedures of the JAC, 
this would not require new law or regulations, 
but rather an intelligent and critical reassessment 
of how existing criteria should be interpreted, 
along with further provision of mentoring and 
training for potential applicants. Consistent with 
this overall goal, the reframing of criteria of 
career progression through the judiciary should 
pay particular attention to encouraging the 
promotion of District and Circuit judges.
   
In case this proposal to review criteria of merit 
appears unrealistically radical, it is worth noting 
that we have a broad model on which to build. 
When the concept of equal pay for work of equal 
value was introduced in 1983, employers were 
required to ensure that they could justify existing 
pay rates not merely by reference to traditional, 
highly gendered conceptions of the value of 
work, but in terms open to rational scrutiny. Our 
suggestion is that a similar approach needs to be 
applied to the concept of merit. Plentiful research 
evidence reveals the extent to which conventional 
conceptions of merit or worth are influenced by 
traditional gender assumptions.87 As in the case 
of job evaluation for the purposes of equal pay, 
this research should inform our reconsideration 
of prevailing notions of merit for the purposes of 
recruitment and promotion.
3.  Gender auditing
We recommend that all legislation be gender 
audited at the drafting stage, with a five-year 
review of any legislation with significant 
implications for gender equality. The scope of 
this auditing is of particular importance given 
that some of the legislation which has had the 
greatest positive impact on women’s lives – 
notably the Minimum Wage legislation (and 
now the New Living Wage) – is not ostensibly 
concerned with gender issues. Gender auditing 
should pay specific attention to streamlining the 
process of claiming/enforcement so as to facilitate 
access to justice. We have an existing model 
on which it is possible to build.  The recently 
created Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Women and Equalities, tasked with ensuring 
real accountability for the enforcement of legal 
equality norms, has the potential – if properly 
resourced and effectively led – to develop into a 
powerful, non-partisan political actor in the style 
of the influential Public Accounts Committee. 
4.   Mainstream gender assumptions within 
legal and university education
We recommend that the gender assumptions 
underlying law, the impact of law on gender 
equality, issues of the intersection between 
gender and other axes of differentiation and 
discrimination, notably ethnicity, and the 
provisions geared to addressing these issues 
in national law and international charters 
including the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights be mainstreamed in both university 
and professional legal education. The 
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Feminist Judgments projects88, among other 
resources, would provide a basis for raising 
awareness. The need to redress gender inequality 
and intersectional disadvantage should be 
incorporated in the professional training of, and 
codes of practice governing the conduct of, 
lawyers, judges and other professionals whose 
work bears on legal enforcement, notably the 
police, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Prison 
Service, the Probation Service, the Border Agency, 
and private companies running immigration 
detention facilities and prisons. 
Much of the evidence which we heard and the 
research carried out in preparing this report 
emphasised the degree to which progress in 
enhancing women’s legal status and ensuring that 
women’s legal rights are worth as much as those 
of men depends on the willingness to subject 
existing arrangements to critical scrutiny. To do 
this there must be adequate information about 
the impact of both those arrangements and the 
dynamics of power and psychology which feed 
into them. Key to this process of re-evaluation is a 
legal education which addresses issues of gender 
inequality and justice rather than attaching itself 
exclusively to an ideal of limited formal equality 
or of a gender neutrality impossible to achieve – 
and potentially damaging to seek – in a world in 
which the distribution of virtually all forms of social 
power is strongly gendered. 
5.   Strengthen the rights of women in custody 
We recommend that further emphasis be 
given to the realisation of the human rights 
of women in custody, both in immigration 
detention and in the criminal justice system, in 
light of recent evidence about poor conditions 
and abusive treatment.89 Successive reports 
over many years have drawn attention to the 
plight of women in the criminal justice system, 
where their relatively small numbers have led to 
special disadvantages – notably in terms of the 
likelihood of being imprisoned far from home, 
of being separated from children for whom they 
are primary carer, or of serving their sentence in a 
prison which is unsuitable or inadequate in terms 
of training, medical or mental health services.90 In 
particular, both sentencing decisions and the design 
of prison regimes should take into account the high 
proportion of women offenders who are themselves 
the victims of violence, trafficking, emotional abuse 
and other forms of gendered disadvantage. 
6.   Review legal aid cuts, abolish tribunal 
and judicial review fees 
We recommend that the recent cuts to legal 
aid be reviewed and, in large part, reversed, 
and that the imposition of fees for hearings 
at tribunals, and for judicial review, be 
abolished. This recommendation is informed 
by the importance of access to justice and 
by evidence showing that retrenchments 
in legal aid and moves towards greater 
deployment of alternative, informal means 
of dispute resolution may be particularly 
disadvantageous to women.
We further recommend that consideration be 
given to the potential to simplify formal court 
procedures so as to reduce the cost of, and 
maximise access within, the state justice system 
rather than simply concentrating on diverting 
cases to mechanisms of informal justice.
In recent years, a huge amount of reformist 
effort has gone into the construction of new 
forms of dispute resolution, including mediation, 
arbitration and restorative justice.91 Arguably, 
however, there is unexploited scope for rethinking 
how court procedure and the structure of the 
legal profession may themselves be adding 
unnecessarily to the costs of enforcing legal 
rights, with adverse effects on access to justice.
7.   Fully incorporate CEDAW, ratify the 
Istanbul Convention 
We recommend that the capacity of the 
legal system to provide meaningful rights for 
women be bolstered not only by retention 
of the Human Rights Act, but also by the 
reinforcement of its strength in the field 
of equality by the full incorporation of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
and ratification of the Istanbul Convention 
on preventing and combating violence 
against women and domestic violence. 
In addition, we recommend that Section 14 
of the Equality Act 2010, dealing with dual 
discrimination, be implemented so as to provide 
more effectively for the pursuit of discrimination 
claims based on disadvantages produced by 
intersecting protected characteristics.
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This section of the report turns 
to the ways in which gender is 
currently framed across a range 
of diverse media sites including 
news media, television drama, 
advertising, and celebrity 
culture. Questions approached in 
this section include the symbolic 
roles women play within culture; 
how “feminism” is understood 
and debated in traditional 
and new media; how race and 
class privilege is mobilised; 
how violence against women is 
represented and imagined; how 
the role of women within the 
economy and in relation to care 
is understood and contested; 
and how women’s identities and 
identifications are produced, 
reproduced and/or challenged. 
In the context of this section 
of our report the twofold use 
of the term representation 
is worth highlighting. As in 
politics, policy, and economics, 
representation refers to the 
under-representation of women. 
Evidence from recent reports, as 
well as evidence delivered to the 
Commission’s session on gender, 
media and culture, demonstrates 
that concerns around the 
representation of women, for 
instance in media organisations, 
as experts on news programmes 
in radio and television, as well 
as cultural producers, are as 
pertinent as in other sectors. 
Additionally, representation 
here also refers to the “presence 
of women”; to the ways in 
which women and gender, in 
conjunction with race, class, 
age, (dis)ability, or sexuality, are 
portrayed in mass media and 
popular culture. Representation 
from this perspective, common in 
the study of media and culture, 
draws on the work of cultural 
theorists such as Stuart Hall1  
and interrogates not only what 
is shown, but also how the ways 
in which issues are framed 
in the media and in cultural 
productions help constitute the 
realities it shows and speaks 
of. Both uses of the term are 
thus relevant when considering 
the multiple mechanisms 
constraining representations, 
reifying existing norms and 
curtailing the full participation 
of women in public and cultural 
life. They point to the varied 
ways in which different groups 
of women are targeted and 
excluded from the media and 
at how representations help to 
shore up conventional gender 
roles and expectations, thus 
playing an important role in 
enabling persistent, multiple 
and intersecting inequalities. 
For instance, for feminists 
working on media and culture, 
key questions have emerged 
around the ways in which 
different media manage public 
expectations of what is natural 
and what is taken for granted 
– what is normalised – not only 
about women as individuals and 
as a group, but also in relation 
to austerity politics, divisions 
among and between genders, and 
other hierarchies, inclusions and 
exclusions.
THE MEDIA
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Current situation
“The continued projection of negative 
and degrading images of women in 
media communications – electronic, 
print, visual and audio – must be 
changed. Print and electronic media 
in most countries do not provide 
a balanced picture of women’s 
diverse lives and contributions to 
society in a changing world. (…) 
The world-wide trend towards 
consumerism has created a climate 
in which advertisements and 
commercial messages often portray 
women primarily as consumers and 
target girls and women of all ages 
inappropriately.”2
Twenty years since the Beijing Platform 
for Action, recent reports on women’s 
representation in the British media demonstrate 
an ongoing need for change. Women are 
severely under-represented in decision-making 
roles in media organisations, where in the UK 
they only occupy 27 per cent (EU 30 per cent) 
of executive management positions.3 With 
30 per cent and 26 per cent, respectively, 
Western Europe ranks lower in terms of 
women’s representation in governance and top 
management of media organisations than both 
Nordic Countries (36 per cent and 37 per cent) 
and Eastern European Countries (33 per cent 
and 43 per cent).4  Additionally, women in UK 
media organisations face a glass ceiling (at junior 
professional level), and under-compensation in 
average and high salary ranges (in comparison, 
compensation at average and low ranges 
is similar between men and women).5 The 
International Women’s Media Foundation 
concludes that, “UK news companies 
exhibit entrenched institutional practices of 
marginalizing women in their newsrooms 
and decision-making hierarchies”.6  In British 
newspapers, “serious” news, most notably 
in the category “politics and government”, is 
predominantly written by male journalists, while 
more “trivial” stories about “celebrity, arts and 
media, sports” are the only categories where 
women write the majority of content.7 The 
networking, campaigning, training and social 
organisation for women journalists, Women 
in Journalism, furthermore identifies gendered 
ageism in media and journalism as “a very 
British problem”, and states that 60 per cent of 
women over 45 have experienced discrimination 
due to their age, and 71 per cent worry about 
being forced out of their careers reaching their 
40s and 50s.8 
Directors UK, the professional association 
of film directors working in the UK, finds 
that while 27 per cent of their membership 
consists of women, many popular dramas and 
entertainment shows have never had a single 
episode directed by a woman.9 Across the whole 
sample, the credits of drama programmes reveal 
that only 14 per cent of directors are women, 
with the sci-fi/fantasy sub-genre employing a 
mere 4 per cent, and of entertainment/comedy 
programmes only 12 per cent are directed by 
women. Factual programmes, on the other 
hand, employ 50 per cent women directors 
over all, albeit gendered by sub-genre. While 63 
per cent of the “body and health” sub-genre 
is directed by women, in “technology and 
science” programmes the figure drops to 29 per 
cent, and in “structured reality” 20 per cent:
“Within factual programme strands 
and series, women are more 
likely to be directing programmes 
with “domestic” subject matter: 
parenting, body image, retail, and 
the domestic terrain dominate as 
subject matters where women are 
well represented as directors.”10 
A study on female representation in the top 
100 grossing films of 2014 finds that women 
comprised only 12 per cent of protagonists 
(29 per cent of major characters), representing 
a decline of 3 per cent from 2013. Women 
of colour were even more severely under-
represented: 74 per cent of all female characters 
were white, 11 per cent black, 4 per cent Latina, 
4 per cent Asian, 3 per cent other-worldly (ie, 
aliens, fantasy characters and the like), and 4 
per cent other.11
  
Just as women are underrepresented as writers 
of news stories, they are also underrepresented 
as subjects of news, where overall they appear 
only in 31 per cent of print news stories, 30 
per cent of radio reports, and 35 per cent of 
televised stories, and are more likely to appear in 
eye witness roles, to provide personal narratives 
or represent public opinion than men who 
predominantly feature as protagonists, experts, 
commentators or spokespersons.12 
“The ways in which women and 
men are represented in news 
media says something profound 
about the ways in which power 
is exercised, whose voices are 
deemed important, which groups 
are given authority to speak.”13 
In comparison, the women to men ratio is much 
worse in news broadcasting and television 
than, for instance, in the cabinet or among 
expert court witnesses. A study of participants 
of the BBC’s Academy training days for woman 
experts shows that women lack confidence, are 
concerned about negative responses, and worry 
about being perceived as “pushy”14  – findings 
which point to a hostile environment and power 
relations rather than substantiating the often 
cited excuse that no women are available to 
speak as experts. The news media is simply not 
representative of society and constitutes an 
environment that is unfavourable to women.15 
The power differentials at work are expressed 
in the double entendre “who makes the 
news?”, the tagline that heads the Global 
Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) which has 
monitored the representation of women in 
relation to men in the world’s news media every 
five years since 1995.16 While recent years have 
shown a growing interest in gender issues, 
media monitoring over four successive editions 
of the GMMP also reveals exceedingly slow 
progress in bringing women’s voices to bear in 
news discourse. 
“Where women do appear, 
they are most frequently found 
in the “social/legal category,” 
often appearing in stories coded 
“legal” because they are victims 
of crime and/or discrimination. 
When we unpack the data a little 
more, we find that where women 
predominate are in stories about 
consumer issues (63 per cent of all 
subjects of such stories are women) 
and all the story categories which 
have a specific gender inflection 
such as women in political power 
(62 per cent), women’s rights/
human rights/minority rights (69 
per cent), gender-based violence 
(69 per cent) and fashion/beauty/
cosmetic surgery (66 per cent)”.17 
The aim of the current GMMP is thus to 
demonstrate persistent and emerging gaps in 
gender representation in print and broadcast, 
as well as in new media such as news websites 
and social media platforms such as Twitter while 
working towards greater accountability.18 
The Leveson Inquiry (2011-2012), the judicial 
public inquiry into the culture, practices 
and ethics of the British press following the 
News International phone hacking scandal, 
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has described the British tabloid press as a 
“demeaning and sexualising lens” that extends 
beyond page 3 models to reducing“ even the 
most accomplished and professional women 
(…) to the sum of their body parts”.19 In 
addition, based on evidence provided by Trans 
Media Watch, the Leveson Inquiry identifies 
tabloid representation of trans*20 issues as 
predominantly within the categories “trans 
as fraud”, “trans as undeserving”, “trans as 
deviant and deserving of parody”, or “the 
outing of transgender people”,21 demonstrating 
the ways in which marginalised groups are (mis)
represented in particular ways.
The intersections between gender and other 
markers of differentiation reveal representational 
practices such as gendered ageism or gendered 
Islamophobia. The Labour Party’s Commission 
on Older Women (2013-2015), with a focus 
on broadcasting, found that older women are 
portrayed in stereotypical ways and/or made 
invisible, particularly on television. While women 
form the majority of over 50s in the UK (53 
per cent), the overwhelming majority of TV 
presenters over 50 are men (82 per cent), and 
only 7 per cent of the total TV workforce (on/
off screen) is women over 50.22 The difference 
is less pronounced in radio, suggesting 
discrimination against older women “on the 
basis of youthful appearance on television, and 
discrimination against women generally on 
radio”.23  As veteran broadcaster Joan Bakewell 
has commented, “Television has this enormous 
influence and the lack of women over a certain 
age is damaging. Women would inevitably feel 
they had to dye their hair to appear.”24 
While British cinema arguably provides a broader 
range of representations of older women than 
Hollywood productions, British television, the 
Commission heard, offers a bleaker image. 
Non hegemonic representations do appear 
across the cultural realm but they are generally 
relegated to minority channels and can therefore 
be seen to further marginalise the subjects. In 
general terms, the aged appearance of men 
is often associated with acquisition, authority, 
and wisdom, while visible signs of aging in 
women are frequently associated with a loss in 
terms of “femininity” and sexual attractiveness, 
reinforcing associations of women’s worth as 
tied to their bodies in ways that men are not. 
Older women are mainly clustered in low-
status, low-budget daytime production where 
they often appear as victims or witnesses, 
potentially reinforcing stereotypes of older 
women as socially passive and vulnerable. 
They are often portrayed in stereotypical 
terms, as unsympathetic “old nags” or as 
parody, sometimes through drag. Mainstream 
comic performances are, as Rosie White 
has suggested, disquieting in their apparent 
assertions that older women are primarily 
grotesque nonetheless such representations can 
also be double-edged, subverting the norms of 
femininity and aging. White cites Mrs Brown’s 
Boys as an example of a “drag” staging of aging 
and femininity:
“Many male performers who 
dress as older women expose 
the heteronormative limits of 
patriarchal discourse via their comic 
discussions of gynaecological issues 
(or ‘women’s trouble’) and also 
mark the limitations ascribed to 
the older woman, by embodying 
the grotesque, excessive aging 
body.  The ‘category crisis’ of 
male to female cross-dressing 
in television comedy does not 
automatically en-tail a radical or 
liberatory transgression; it can also 
reiterate the binary under-standing 
of gender that positions women 
as more subject to the vicissitudes 
of their natural bodies than men.  
Men cross-dressing as older women 
may thus be understood as both 
an exposé of the taboos which 
adhere to aging femininity and as 
misogyny in action.”25   
Where older women are portrayed in a more 
positive light, it is frequently in representations 
of white middle class heterosexual (married or 
divorced, rarely single) successful agers. Older 
working class women and women of colour are 
often cast in stereotypical roles or portrayed in 
negative terms.26  
The post-9/11 years have seen a marked shift 
in patterns of representation of Muslim women 
and the veil. The connotations of the veil have 
acquired a contradictory set of associations 
from being represented primarily as a sign of 
oppression to contemporary portrayals which 
also use it as a sign of refusal of western 
modernity. This complexity and contradiction 
accompanies a related addition to the figure 
of the Muslim woman as victim, with Muslim 
woman also seen as perpetrators.27  Young 
Muslim women in particular have been 
represented simultaneously as potential victims, 
as threat and as vulnerable subjects, open to 
“extremism”. These media representations 
are frequently explicitly aligned with 
government policies related to the question 
of “radicalisation” that the war on terror has 
adopted. Recent evidence highlighting this 
phenomenon is the reporting of so-called British 
“jihadi brides” where the news media have 
disproportionately amplified a very small number 
of cases (4-5), further contributing to what may 
be seen as negative representations of Muslim 
communities.28 
In summary, women are underrepresented 
both as media producers and as media subjects 
across all platforms.29 When they are present 
as producers, they face the “glass ceiling” and 
leave the industry much earlier than men30, and 
as media subjects, they are often represented in 
contradictory but nonetheless conventionalised 
and sometimes stereotypical terms. The 
intersection of gender and factors such as (but 
not limited to) age, class, ethnicity and gender 
identity mean that older women, working class 
women, women of colour and trans* women 
face additional challenges to becoming media 
producers or appearing across media and 
cultural production as fully rounded subjects. 
In addition to noting the persistent relative 
absence of women as media producers and 
subjects, key issues in contemporary research 
on gender and the media include consideration 
of mediated responses to austerity; discourses 
around violence against women, representations 
of feminisms and women in leadership; as 
well as the intersectional effects of gender 
and class, ethnicity, age and sexuality in media 
representation. In considering the broad range 
of evidence interrogating the role of gender in 
UK media landscapes provided at the media and 
culture session of the Commission for Gender 
Inequality and Power, the following sections 
cluster around the cross-cutting themes of 
power, work-life balance, and violence.
Symbolic power
The particular ways in which gender, race, 
and other sets of power structures – such as 
austerity politics – are represented across a wide 
range of media and popular culture play an 
important role in determining what frames of 
reference become available to the wider public 
to make sense of the world.  Bourdieu has 
described symbolic power as “world-making” 
process:31 the power to shape what counts 
as common sense and impose which social 
divisions are legitimate. Media production and 
representations are understood here not simply 
as reflective of a social and political reality to 
be discovered and truthfully reported, but 
constitutive of what kinds of interpretations 
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are possible, and thus formative of our social 
reality. In this sense, the media wields symbolic 
power32 in (re)producing and circulating ideas 
that frame what is considered normal or 
abnormal and thus is in a position to reinforce 
but also potentially ameliorate inequalities. 
These inequalities are sometimes reinforced 
not only between and within genders, but also 
by constructing and sustaining very particular 
discourses as appropriate ways of thinking. 
For example, with reference to austerity 
measures a focus on individual responsibility 
for a “successful life” obscures the underlying 
neoliberal and meritocratic ideals which 
sideline structural inequalities. The role the 
media and popular culture play in reproducing 
and circulating “common sense ideas” can 
contribute to the resilience and persistence 
of hierarchies between and within genders, 
as well as the entrenchment of, for example, 
retrograde or highly conventionalized gender 
roles and binary constructions of gender. These 
patterns are by no means monolithic, given 
the ways that popular culture operates there 
remain contradictions in the ways that gender 
is represented. Nevertheless, such normalising 
mechanisms are aided by a frequent conflation 
of gender with women and the unquestioning 
ways in which a binary understanding of gender 
(ie, solely as a variable with the attributes male/
female) is employed.
These representational regimes are significant 
features in determining the available framings in 
several distinct areas. In the context of financial 
crisis, austerity Britain is often presented as an 
inevitable response as dubious understandings 
about how the economy works tends to 
construct inequality as the result of failure to 
take individual responsibility. Similarly, narratives 
around gender based violence or violence 
against women frequently imply that women’s 
“vulnerability” is determined by their attention, 
or lack thereof, to their own personal safety. 
Within the sphere of elite politics, the assumed 
masculinity of political institutions works to 
marginalise female actors, and problematic 
representations of those women who do attain 
positions of power frequently undercuts their 
presence in the public sphere. 
Representing the Recession and its Aftermath
Turning first to symbolic representation in the 
wake of the financial crisis, research by Diane 
Negra and others33 has addressed how a variety 
of media adapted to austerity and contributed 
to the normalisation of austerity politics. At the 
most basic level, recessionary popular culture 
tends to over-represent those least damaged by 
the economic context and under-represents those 
most affected. Furthermore, representation of 
austerity itself has also been highly gendered, for 
example by images of the “nanny state” on one 
hand, and toughness and austerity as premised 
on masculinised virtues on the other. 
More broadly however, substantial cultural shifts 
have emerged as the recession has factored 
as an opportunity to consolidate and “reboot 
established, enduring ideological precepts 
about class, race, consumerism, individualism, 
work, and (…) gender”34. Furthermore, post-
feminism has been repositioned within this 
representational landscape as framework to be 
deployed in the management of crisis capitalism. 
The highly gendered cultural response to the 
financial crisis is evident in a series of masculine 
and feminine figures that are replicated 
across a variety of media platforms. Where 
women have been imagined in recessionary 
terms, it has largely been via the trope of 
a “coping” femininity that remains allied 
to consumption, albeit tempered by thrift. 
Popular terms like “recessionista” recuperate 
female consumerism despite reduced 
resources, and positive thinking emerges as a 
gendered recessionary skill in “rescue reality” 
television genres and independent films. The 
neo-domestic turn in reality television (for 
example “Extreme Couponing” in the US 
or “Kirstie’s Homemade Home” in the UK) 
commodifies domestic cultures, celebrating 
female consumer resourcefulness on the 
one hand and pathologising working class 
consumption on the other. This gendered 
coping narrative is bolstered by the feminisation 
of entrepreneurship and images of female 
moguls espousing individual strategies to 
counter structural disadvantage in texts such 
as Sheryl Sandberg’s Lean In35  and exemplified 
by a particular brand of recessionary television 
programming (see below). 
In contrast, economic insecurity is frequently 
depicted as a male predicament, in which 
working class white masculinity in particular 
is portrayed as being in crisis. Post-feminist 
texts such as The End of Men and the Rise 
of Women by Hanna Rosin contribute to 
discourses around threatened masculinity 
in which cultural emphasis is given to male 
infantilism, underdevelopment, disadvantage, 
injury, and vulnerability.36 These ideas are 
predicated on a zero sum logic in which 
women’s gains undermine male autonomy. 
Although this logic precedes the financial 
crash, has been exacerbated in its aftermath.  
Despite contradictory images of masculine 
financial and corporate authority and wealth 
triumphalism, these discourses form a staple 
of popular culture, as exemplified by cinematic 
representations of male tycoons in films such as 
The Social Network, The Wolf of Wall Street or 
Wall Street Money Never Sleeps.
Film, TV, and digital cultures during this period 
have worked to “compensate for broad 
vulnerabilities of economic citizenship with 
gendered rhetorics of power [and] success”.37 
While conservative cultural industries, by 
necessity, have begun to acknowledge 
persistent inequalities, they have often done so 
in contorted and paradoxical ways.38 A recession 
might have held potential for rethinking 
gendered and classed hegemonies, but it has 
instead frequently entrenched them further. 
Framing Feminism(s)
Feminist responses to these issues and frames 
are visible in the mainstream media. However, as 
research by Kaitlynn Mendes39 shows, the press has 
legitimised and supported some forms of feminism 
while de-legitimising, ignoring or silencing others. 
Although feminist actors have recently turned 
to social media and blogging in order to gain 
greater control over the ways in which they are 
represented, these interventions are tempered by 
the degree to which the wider public learns about 
social movements via mainstream publications and 
broadcasting, even in what Manuel Castells terms 
the “postmedia age”.40  
Mendes summarizes historic representations of 
first and second wave feminists as “deviant” 
and “failed women”, cast as unattractive, 
unfeminine, undesirable, and unable to 
compete for male attention. The effect of 
these representations was to de-legitimise the 
Suffragettes and Women’s Liberation Movement 
without engaging with the content of these 
feminist challenges to the social order, instead 
treating women’s activism as a spectacle and 
relying on the belittlement of feminist actors. 
A key figure in this discourse which has yet to 
be shed is that of the mythical “bra burner”. 
While some feminists have actively rejected the 
stereotype, others have asked, what exactly 
is so disturbing about burning a bra, and 
why has this label been used so effectively 
against feminists? Additionally, anti-feminist 
media representations have historically framed 
feminism as harmful or dangerous to both 
men and women, constituting what Susan 
Faludi terms “backlash”.41 While claiming that 
feminists are deviant is merely anti-feminist, 
backlash discourses claim that feminism was 
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once legitimately supported, but is now going 
too far as the original feminist goal of gender 
equality has supposedly been achieved. Others 
feign a desire to support feminism, but inability 
to do so due to the excessive demands of a 
“feminist agenda”.  
These historical representations are important in 
the contemporary context because, as Mendes 
points out, stories of feminists as deviant and 
harmful are cyclical, re-emerging re-packaged in 
every era which experiences renewed feminist 
activism. For example, longstanding ideas of a 
war between the sexes which posit the rights 
gained by one sex as at the expense of the other 
and cast women as getting more of their fair 
share are echoed in the recessionary popular 
culture which contrasts entrepreneurial women 
with a crisis of masculinity. 
Despite these cyclical negative narratives around 
feminists and feminism, there have also been 
some significant shifts in the mediation of 
successive waves of feminism. Some forms 
of feminism have been legitimised through 
engagement with feminist issues, constructions 
of a unified feminist movement, and the 
normalisation of certain types of feminists.  
However, media representations tend to 
legitimise acceptable liberal feminism at the 
expense of unacceptable radical feminism, often 
making use of qualifiers such as “non-militant”, 
“not radical”, “happily married” or by making 
reference to conventionally attractive, feminine 
appearance. Thus the figure of the bra burner 
remains salient by its negation. 
The recent framing of feminism as “cool” 
has been helped by the adoption of the label 
by celebrities such as Beyonce, Taylor Swift, 
Benedict Cumberbatch, Lena Dunham, and 
Emma Watson, as well as activism such as 
the Fawcett Society’s “This is What a Feminist 
Looks Like” t-shirt campaign. These images 
have publicly challenged well worn stereotypes 
as well as raising the profile of feminist ideas. 
Where feminists were once routinely cast as 
deviant, articles praising Emma Watson for her 
role in the UN backed “He for She” campaign 
can be found across the national press, from the 
Guardian to the Daily Mail. 
Certain types of campaigns have gained 
particularly strong levels of coverage, including 
those addressing rape culture, slut-shaming, 
the policing of women’s bodies, and issues of 
consent, sexual and domestic violence. FGM and 
female objectification are also receiving attention. 
However, while debates around intersectionality 
are prominent within feminist activism and 
scholarship, issues specifically affecting migrant, 
older, BME, trans* or other women with 
multiply subordinated identities are less visible. 
Furthermore, the visibility of campaigns such as 
SlutWalk suggests that feminist activism is more 
likely to gain attention when women’s bodies are 
on display. This is especially troubling when, in 
the case of SlutWalk, coverage frequently fails to 
frame the movement as feminist, partly because 
activists themselves are often reluctant to do so in 
order to avoid backlash. 
In addition to prominent coverage of celebrity 
feminists and activists, writers including Laura 
Bates, Laurie Penny, Anita Sarkeesian, and 
Jessica Valenti are also highly visible speaking 
from feminist standpoints in mainstream media. 
Thus although anti-feminist and backlash 
discourses remain prevalent, they are by no 
means ubiquitous or unchallenged. 
Like feminist activists, female politicians have 
also been historically been subject to a variety of 
undermining media frames which are renewed 
in updated forms every election season. For 
example, recent iterations of “Blair’s Babes”, the 
moniker for the influx of Labour women to the 
Commons in 1997, include “Cameron’s Cuties” 
in 2010 and “Dave’s Dolls” in 2015. The British 
press continues to render female politicians 
less visible than male party leaders’ wives, and 
when they do gain coverage they are frequently 
belittled by reference to their appearance and 
couture,42 as demonstrated by references to 
the “Downing Street Catwalk” in reporting 
of Cameron’s July 2014 cabinet reshuffle. 
Meanwhile, women’s issues are consistently 
marginalized. Women in politics who prioritise 
providing substantive gendered representation 
are often singled out for exceptionally negative 
treatment, such as the author of the 2010 
Equalities Act, Harriet “Harperson” Harman. 
Nirmal Puwar43 suggests that the hyper visibility 
and surveillance applied to certain women 
and minorities in the public sphere stems 
from a “reluctance to bestow authority on 
racialised and gendered bodies”. There is ample 
evidence for this phenomenon in 2015 election 
coverage of SNP Leader, Nicola Sturgeon, 
notably described as “the most dangerous 
woman in British politics”. Throughout the 
campaign, negative gendered descriptions 
of Sturgeon’s character and appearance 
abounded, with descriptions ranging from 
a “power-dressing imperatrix” to “William 
Wallace without a beard”.  Furthermore, as the 
election approached and the SNP leader gained 
increasing support from the public, this was 
depicted both as an emasculation of her male 
rivals, who were “not tough enough” to stand 
up to her, and as a threat to the country, with 
headlines such as the Star’s, “Nic holds Britain 
by the ballots”.
Thus, media and popular culture representations 
of women, gender, feminists and feminism 
constitute a discursive battleground for symbolic 
power. While women’s and feminists’ voices are 
increasingly visible, both within the mainstream 
press and other areas of public life, backlash 
discourses, victim blaming and the undermining 
of women with political power remain causes 
for concern. 
Mediated (Re)production  
and Work-life Balance
Considering the ways in which themes around 
(re)productive work are represented in the media 
and popular culture offers an opportunity to 
think questions of time, work and pay alongside 
one another. It also raises questions around 
individualism and meritocracy in general, and 
the problematic individualisation of responsibility 
for escaping poverty, for achieving equality, 
and for leading a happy and successful life in 
particular. While the popular brand of such 
individualised feminism, exemplified not least by 
Sheryl Sandberg (the chief operating officer of 
Facebook) and her instant bestseller “Lean In”,44 
has contributed to raising the public profile and 
media presence of ongoing gender inequalities, 
it equally erases efforts of collective organising 
for social justice and equality and the need for 
intersectional approaches. In a nutshell, Sandberg 
argues that, prevalent gender inequalities in 
the workplace notwithstanding, self-doubt and 
excuses will not get women into the boardroom, 
while confidence, seizing opportunities and 
leaning in will go a long way towards executive 
leadership. Much of the evidence presented 
to the Commission concerns how media and 
popular culture represent the (im)balance 
between (un)paid work and a life. It shows that 
in current representations the responsibility for 
breaking the glass ceiling and for achieving 
equality at the workplace is largely relegated to 
individual (privileged white) women and their 
ability to “lean in”. 
This individualised and entrepreneurial feminist 
subject45 is produced through post-feminist 
discourse46 and its effect across the media 
landscape is to make it difficult to disentangle 
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“feminism” from a broader marketization of 
equality under neoliberalism.47  Relatedly, the 
representation of feminism(s) in the media has 
undertaken a similar shift where the failure to 
achieve equality is often attributed to individual 
women, sidelining (though not completely 
ignoring) the wider systematic disadvantages 
women face. Feminism is increasingly 
represented as an expression of identity rather 
than an ideology geared towards social justice48  
and public feminism is increasingly invoked by 
celebrities, for whom it can appear to function 
primarily as a “credential of entrepreneurial 
self-branding”.49 Feminist media studies offer a 
unique perspective for interpreting “recession 
culture”, given its focus on collective symbolic 
environments and their role in shaping 
public views and the lives embedded within 
representational cultures.50  
The remainder of this section turns to selected 
case studies presented to the Commission’s 
media and culture session to illustrate and 
critique the contemporary representational 
practices that are engendered by a contradictory 
set of discursive “post-feminist” framings. 
These inconsistencies and contradictions in the 
ways that women as subjects are represented 
makes sustained critique particularly difficult 
and thus undermines any concerted opposition, 
particularly in the name of feminism.
The Meritocratic Deficit51 – the “Mumpreneur”
Meritocracy holds that regardless of position 
at birth, a combination of talent and personal 
effort will lead to success and social mobility. 
This position has gradually taken the form of 
a common-sense norm, which in the current 
political climate is difficult to challenge as 
it goes hand in hand with wider neoliberal 
discourses. The term meritocracy has taken 
an etymological U-turn: from left-wing 
critique (levelling the playing field rather than 
further privileging the already privileged) to 
contemporary neoliberal understandings that 
contort the idea of government by the people 
through their abilities into an individualism that 
emphasises self-marketing and entrepreneurship. 
The meritocratic deficit, then, refers to the 
fiction of the level playing field that meritocracy 
ideologically relies on. To illustrate how this 
construction works in favour of already privileged 
elites, Jo Littler provides evidence in form of a 
case study centring on the “Mumpreneur”, that 
is, a mother turned entrepreneur by establishing 
her own business – usually styled in shades of 
pink, highly gendered in terms of its activity, and 
operating from her home. 
The “Mumpreneur” is a social type, a figure 
that gains valiancy through media repetition 
and even gets its own annual awards 
ceremony (see Figure 1). This figure has a 
great deal to tell about gender and inequality. 
“Mumpreneurs” are predominantly from a 
privileged demographic and thus able to draw 
on the cultural, economic, and social capital52  
necessary to found a business. The figure 
of the “Mumpreneur” evokes the discourse 
of neoliberal meritocracy, revived through a 
crisis in corporate capitalism, and resurfaces 
the unresolved relationship between gender 
and childcare that second wave feminism 
had foregrounded. Perhaps on a different 
register but situated in ways similar to the 
“lean in” brand of feminism referenced above, 
“Mumpreneurs” and their representations 
in media and popular culture can be read 
as reinforcing individualism and the idea 
of marketing a profitable entrepreneurial 
self while retaining the gendered norm of 
the foundation parent. “Mumpreneurs” 
might be seen as a heroic solution to the 
challenges posed by privatisation, austerity 
culture and the meritocratic dream: mothers 
successfully overcome adversities by thriving as 
entrepreneurs. Examples from popular culture 
that the “Mumpreneur” resonates with include 
television programmes such as The Apprentice 
or Britain’s Got Talent. Alternatively, it is worth 
thinking about ways in which to orient such 
activity away from corporate discourse and 
individual achievement – for instance by moving 
closer to Nancy Fraser’s universal caregiver 
model54 in refiguring work and its relation to 
childcare, and in addressing related issues that 
include over-work culture or the housing crisis. 
Media representations that already reference 
the meritocratic deficit exemplified here by the 
figure of the “Mumpreneur”, for example by 
highlighting the “class ceiling” that those lacking 
the necessary privilege face, include recent 
programmes like Breaking Bad or Better Call Saul 
where just trying hard is simply not enough to 
succeed. Popular culture can thus be seen as a 
site of negotiation where dominant ideas about 
values around the relation between paid work, 
the economy and caring are elaborated. 
Mediating women and work55 – The Good Wife
Shani Orgad’s case study juxtaposes media 
representations of “stay-at-home” mothers 
such as the television series The Good Wife 
and news stories and the lived experience of 
middle class women who left paid employment 
upon having children.56 Consistent with 
representations of “stay-at-home” mothers 
in the media, the decision of Alicia, The Good 
Wife’s protagonist, to quit her job upon having 
children is constructed as a personal choice. 
The show centres on her return to work in a 
prestigious law firm after 13 years as a “stay-at-
home” mother, following her husband’s arrest 
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due to a mediated sex scandal. The 13 years she 
spent outside the labour market as a stay-at-
home mother do not seem to affect her return 
to professional life very much at all. She exudes 
confidence, excels at juggling her husband’s 
scandal, her professional life, and motherhood. 
Alicia’s image echoes media representations of 
career mothers, distinct from both the “happy 
housewife” of the 60s and the “super mum” 
of the 80s. Her character is more complex, 
and in some ways non-normative: The Good 
Wife refrains from tedious juggling metaphors 
and portrays Alicia as a mature, competent 
and confident professional, mother, wife, and 
woman in her own right.57 However, unlike 
Alicia Florrick, non-fictional women in similar 
situations question whether the decision to leave 
paid employment and become full-time mothers 
was entirely their own “choice”. They point 
to a series of factors, such as pressures from 
their husbands and their demanding careers, 
work cultures that are incompatible with family 
life, lack of workplace support structures, and 
cultural messages about motherhood, that have 
“forced” them to make this choice. They find 
“re-inventing” themselves and returning to the 
work-force rather more challenging and elusive. 
The transition into professional life is rarely 
smooth but poses many challenges: corporate 
life is fast-paced, many women recount 
difficulties with picking up where they left off 
years ago, feeling that they are made invisible 
and suffer great anxiety. They experience many 
obstacles in finding and managing childcare, 
and are often left to deal with the logistics of 
professional life and managing a household 
predominantly on their own. In contrast to such 
experiences, contemporary representations 
of career mothers (such as The Good Wife) 
largely obscure problems around childcare 
provision – Alicia’s mother in law, while 
characterised as rather intrusive and annoying, 
seems readily available to fill in at all times. 
While representations such as The Good Wife 
ameliorate the inconsistency between public 
perceptions of ideal motherhood and everyday 
reality, many non-fictional women cannot simply 
leave behind the tedious demands of managing 
employment and family life, but continue to 
live what to them is a reality – the “new sexual 
contract”58 remains an unfulfilled fantasy. Thus 
women’s capacity to return to paid work after 
some time away from the labour market and 
their ability to reach senior leadership positions is 
not merely a matter of cracking the “confidence 
code”, self-regulation strategies, assertiveness, 
or leaning in, as suggested by a range of 
contemporary representations. Rather, women’s 
return to paid work is constrained by social, 
cultural, political, economic, and personal factors 
that often legitimise and sustain inequalities. 
Recessionary television programming59 
Feminist media analyses of recent years has 
critically reflected on the representational 
practices produced in (and reproductive of) a 
political climate marked by the financial crisis and 
its aftermath, the recession, and austerity politics. 
Negra and Tasker61 have interrogated the gendered 
responses to the recession across a variety of 
mediated contexts and identified a particular brand 
of “post-feminist” recessionary popular culture62  
that activates some vocabularies of gender while 
marginalising others, often to the detriment of 
the least privileged. Recessionary reality television 
and makeover programmes, in particular, promote 
and normalise neoliberal individualism in the form 
of gendered, raced and classed subjects striving 
for social betterment. Reality television has proven 
itself very adaptable to the economic downturn, 
individuals are often encouraged to spend their 
way out of adverse situations, coached by celebrity 
experts. Personal betterment is the privileged logic 
of these programmes: the narratives suggest that, 
if only one tries hard enough, success will follow. 
This trend is illustrated by programmes like The 
Fairy Jobmother (2010), where the realities of 
the neoliberal job market are transcended and 
candidates demonstrate that jobs await those who 
search well enough.63 Job seekers participating in 
the programme “are encouraged to (…) believe 
that “positivity is the key to everything”, and 
to buoy themselves up with self-empowerment 
rhetoric (“I am the man that can!”)”.64  
One typical example of these figures is the 
prevalence of the female cupcake baker,65 a 
figure who holds in place feminised aesthetics 
and combines it with the diminutively “cute”, 
the new (gendered) fetish food, and becomes 
exemplary of adaptive economies built around 
female entrepreneurialism (see also the 
“Mumpreneur” above). Despite a gendered 
pay gap, occupational segregation, and a 
deficit of women in business leadership, a 
spate of magazine articles and books imagine 
“the new majority of female breadwinners” 
in an age of austerity. Meanwhile, significant 
cultural emphasis is given to male infantilism 
and underdevelopment, disadvantage, injury, 
vulnerability and so on – this appears to be 
predicated on an assumption that workplace 
success is a zero-sum game in which if women 
are gaining, men must be losing. Thus any 
imagined rise in women’s economic and cultural 
power represents women as surging ahead to 
the detriment of men.66
Gendered Representations of Violence
Just as gendered representations in the 
recessionary context have tend to praise 
“feminine” resourcefulness rather than 
critiquing structural gendered economic 
disadvantage, representations of gendered 
forms of violence similarly have been noted as 
often focusing on regulating the behaviour of 
victims or potential victims, rather than that 
of perpetrators. Indeed, as Karen Boyle67 has 
pointed out, the very language of “gender 
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based violence” – often used as a synonym for 
“(men’s) violence against women” – can obscure 
the masculine gender of the perpetrator which 
it implies. However, while the term “violence 
against women” makes women visible as 
victims, it also excludes male victims of gendered 
violence, as well as implying male perpetrators 
when this is not necessarily the case. While 
neither term is necessarily preferable over the 
other, media representations which use them 
interchangeably when specifically referring to 
men’s violence against women can be read as 
contributing to discourses which negate the 
responsibility of perpetrators.
Reporting of men’s violence against women 
frequently combines contradictory narratives 
which pay some attention to feminist 
interventions while simultaneously reproducing 
“victim-blaming” tropes. For example, as Karen 
Boyle explained at the Commission hearing 
in April 2015, District Judge Neil Cadbury 
commented on the murder of 21 year old Karen 
Buckley in Glasgow, stating that “It’s very, very 
worrying how young girls put themselves in 
such very, very vulnerable positions”.68 Cadbury’s 
comments were made during the sentencing 
of another woman for an unrelated assault, 
conflating the two and rendering the women 
as both vulnerable and culpable. The Telegraph 
broke the story, with the headline “Karen Buckley 
killing: Judge suggests student ‘put herself 
in vulnerable position’ by drinking”.69  While 
the article cited Sarah Green of End Violence 
Against Women, and framed the story as one 
of sexism, its mention of whether Buckley had 
been drinking on the night of her murder also 
replicated Cadbury’s implication that women bear 
responsibility for their own safety. Jo Costello of 
Everyday Victim Blaming has pointed out that 
“If you suggest that a woman can avoid rape 
if she changes her behaviour, you are saying 
‘make sure he rapes the other woman.’ The one 
who wasn’t so sensible. The one who didn’t 
change her behaviour.”70 Thus, this type of 
reporting results in coverage which is in danger of 
perpetuating the problem it purports to address. 
Furthermore, the intense scrutiny of victims and 
their differential treatment depending on factors 
such as age, class or perceived attractiveness adds 
to the already heavy cost to women of testifying 
to men’s violence. 
The risks associated with speaking out against 
male violence against women are exemplified by 
the 2011 case of Nafissatou Diallo, an immigrant 
hotel maid in New York who made allegations 
of sexual assault and attempted rape against the 
then director of the International Monetary Fund, 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Research by Anita 
Biressi shows that responses to Diallo’s allegations 
went beyond assertions that the victim was 
responsible for her own protection.71 They instead 
constituted a media “witch hunt” against the 
domestic worker who had spoken out. Biressi 
demonstrated that narratives used to frame the 
case included that of a “farcical comedy”, “porn 
movie” or “honey-trap conspiracy”, and Diallo 
was characterised alternately as a part-time 
sex worker, gold-digger or false asylum seeker. 
The raced and classed aspects of these frames 
highlight the intersectional nature of responses 
to male violence against women who do not 
conform to “ideal victim” status. 
In contrast to Diallo’s characterisation, Dominic 
Strauss-Kahn’s crime was reduced to a personal 
flaw or “domestic” incident gone wrong, and he 
was depicted as a victim of Diallo’s “economic 
interests” or a political conspiracy. Thus it can 
be seen that news frames inverted the power 
dynamic between the two, representing Strauss-
Kahn as a disempowered victim rather than a 
powerful perpetrator. Diallo’s appearance on 
ABC’s Good Morning America following the 
incident was described by Strauss-Kahn’s lawyers 
as an “unseemly circus designed to inflame 
public opinion”. By refusing to be silenced, 
Diallo was publicly reprimanded by behaving 
contrary to unspoken rules of engagement. The 
final resolution of the case via a civil lawsuit was 
then framed as Diallo being “paid” for a mere 
six minute encounter, while Strauss-Kahn was 
portrayed as a tragic victim who had lost his 
position at the IMF, his marriage, and his dreams 
of becoming the French president as a result. 
While the representation of male violence against 
women remains highly problematic, women’s 
experiences are more visible than they have been in 
the past, and exceptions such as Nick Broomfield’s 
documentary, The Grim Sleeper, do buck the trend 
by placing scrutiny on perpetrators and addressing 
the intersectional effects of women’s identity 
on media responses to violent crimes against 
them. However, despite these exceptions, the 
continued rhetoric of making women responsible 
for male violence mirrors wider patterns in 
gendered media frames. There are parallels in the 
individualistic narratives of women’s responsibility 
to respond to recession and austerity with thrift 
and entrepreneurialism and their apparent 
responsibility to protect themselves from violence 
by moderating their own behaviour. Both narratives 
symbolically erase the structural factors which result 
in women’s economic disadvantage and exposure 
to male violence.  Similarly, there are parallels in 
the gendered framing of austerity as a “crisis of 
masculinity”, and the representation of individuals 
such as Strauss-Kahn as tragic male figures. 
While traditional media layers symbolic violence 
over literal violence, new media has created 
new avenues for more overt violence towards 
women who enter the public sphere. While 
many feminists have taken to social media 
in order to gain greater control over their 
own representation, doing so runs the risk 
of encountering extreme harassment, often 
including rape threats and death threats. 
Research by DEMOS observed around 100,000 
instances of the word “rape” used in UK-based 
Twitter accounts during the period 26 December 
2013 to 9 February 2014, approximately 
12 per cent of which were estimated to be 
threatening.72  Feminist author, Guardian 
columnist and founder of feministing.com, 
Jessica Valenti, has reported significant physical 
and emotional safety concerns following 
persistent online sexist abuse.73 
Targets of online violence against women are 
also not restricted to visible feminists. Pew 
Research indicates that women between the 
ages of 18 to 24 are significantly more likely to 
have been stalked or sexually harassed online 
than men, and are also more likely to experience 
this as traumatic.74 While social media is 
certainly not responsible for the creation of 
online misogyny, micro blogging and social 
networking sites frequently fail to adequately 
moderate content in order to protect women 
from it. This may be exacerbated by the fact 
that, just as in traditional media, women and 
ethnic minorities are severely underrepresented 
within social media industries. For example, 
in 2014 Twitter reported that 70 per cent of 
its company is male, rising to 79 per cent in 
leadership positions and 90 per cent in tech 
based roles.75 
A final aspect of gendered representations 
of violence we wish to highlight here by way 
of conclusion references the relationship 
between the economic crisis and its regime of 
austerity politics, paralleled and sustained by 
the means of recessionary popular culture (see 
above) on the one hand, and security crises 
and their impact on everyday life on the other. 
Militarisation and securitization increasingly 
seep into everyday life of women and men, 
for instance by the means of (border) security 
mechanisms that shift “inwards” to universities, 
employers, and the welfare state, but also by 
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the means of representational practices that 
demonise migrants and asylum seekers and 
legitimise mass surveillance in the name of 
security, to name but a few examples. The 
War on Terror, through its “circulation of open 
secrets and accounts of torture and abuse”, 
furthermore includes a cultural project that 
seeks to produce a pro-war consenting global 
audience of witnesses/participants alongside its 
military project76. Bhattacharyya has argued that 
these tendencies require a broader (feminist) 
focus than women’s lives and gender, and a 
re-orientation towards radical social justice 
“feminism for difficult times”.77  
Ways Forward
The evidence presented to the Commission 
has identified wide-ranging concerns regarding 
women’s representation both as media producers 
and subjects. While activists and media scholars 
continue to reignite debates around achieving 
change in the media, many of the suggested 
remedies that have emerged from these debates – 
for example, in the context of the Leveson Inquiry 
– have yet to be acted upon. Furthermore, issues 
of women’s representation as media producers 
and subjects are complex and interwoven, calling 
for joined up change on multiple fronts. Thus, 
based on the evidence heard, the Commission 
has identified several clusters within which to 
posit ways forward, including considering sites of 
representation, education and training, and the 
implementation of existing recommendations. 
While there are clear links between women’s 
position as media producers and subjects, it 
is crucial not to assume that more women in 
newsrooms, film and television production 
or social media companies will automatically 
lead either to wholesale improvements in the 
quantity and quality of women’s representation, 
or to more critical and nuanced framing of 
gender issues. The somewhat anti-feminist 
content of some recent Hollywood film output 
produced and directed by women shows how 
misguided such assumptions are. However, 
as in politics and other spheres of public life, 
female media producers operate at present as a 
minority. This can be considered as a problem in 
itself. It is in the interests of broader and fairer 
participation that it be redressed. 
Shifting Representations
Firstly, while feminists have taken up the task of 
critiquing varied problems regarding gendered 
media representations, there is still a dearth 
of data on this subject, despite the work of 
major, longitudinal studies such as the Global 
Media Monitoring Project. Increased qualitative 
and quantitative data, as well as longitudinal 
and comparative analyses across factual and 
fictional media are much needed. Even with 
this information, this is not an area in which it is 
easy to develop policy recommendations. There 
are important reasons why, generally speaking, 
feminist media scholars have been reluctant 
to dictate solutions. Intervening in the cultural 
sphere raises challenges: tangible targets for 
policy interventions problematic are hard to find 
because any form of censorship, perceived or 
real, poses significant issues regarding freedom 
of speech as well as a free press.
However, the Commission would recommend 
the establishment of a standing committee 
such as a national gender observatory tasked 
with monitoring media production and the 
representation of gender in the ways described 
above, as well as intervening in the public 
debate around such issues. Interventions could 
for example take the form of participating in 
the visibility and attention received by especially 
problematic programmes, responses to high 
profile incidents of violence against women 
such as the murder of Karen Buckley, and 
media framing of women with political power 
during moments such as the “Downing Street 
Catwalk”. These contexts present opportunities 
for feminist media scholars and activists to add 
to critical commentary online, in print, and be 
available for expert interviews and comments on 
radio and television. 
Education and Training
Despite the aforementioned reservations about 
interventions into the cultural sphere, feminist 
scholars, professionals and activists on the nexus 
between media production, representation, 
and reception remain of course committed to 
gender equality. Education and training emerges 
as one key cluster of possible interventions to 
support positive shifts in the ways in which 
the media represent gender related topics and 
their intersections with other in-/exclusions and 
hierarchies in the longer term. The Commission 
sees potential, both in terms of children and 
young persons’ education, and professional 
training for journalists, editorial staff, and other 
media professionals. These recommendations 
would propose interventions, therefore, into the 
national curriculum, and also into professional 
associations for training journalists (NCTJ, for 
instance) to ensure that gender education was 
central to the curriculum.
This includes critical media literacy, not only in 
terms of how to read the media but also in terms 
of how to educate journalists. The latter would be 
achievable if accrediting bodies were mandated 
to do so and annual auditing implemented, 
and respectively if educators were required to 
implement what is already regulation.78 
Existing Recommendations  
Awaiting Implementation
Most pertinently in relation to women and minority 
representation in the print media, the Leveson 
Inquiry recommends that the new press regulator 
needs to be equipped with the power to act on 
third party complaints. To this end, the complaints 
system needs to allow for generic complaints 
that are representative of women’s groups and 
other minority representatives to be raised against 
misleading or inaccurate coverage of issues such 
as violence against women or immigration, rather 
than claims on behalf of individual and personally 
identified “victims” as re-quired by the previous 
complaints procedure. This requires considering 
amendments to the Editors’ Code of Practice in 
order to achieve a balance between the protection 
of freedom of speech and press and allowing for 
interventions against discriminatory reporting to 
reflect “the spirit of equalities legislation”79  
Recommendations: 
1.   Establish a standing committee, such as 
a national gender observatory, tasked 
with monitoring media production and 
the representation of gender, and with 
intervening in the public debate around 
such issues.
We recommend that a standing committee 
tasked with quantitative and qualitative 
monitoring of women’s participation in 
media production be established. This 
committee could also respond to issues in relation 
to the representation of gender by providing 
a forum for the diversification of voices heard 
intervening in public debates around relevant 
issues. Interventions could, for example, take 
the form of responses to high profile incidents 
of violence against women such as the murder 
of Karen Buckley, and media framing of women 
with political power during moments such as the 
“Downing Street Catwalk”. These and related 
contexts would present opportunities for feminist 
media scholars and activists to add to critical 
commentary. However, reactive critique is not 
enough, we would like to see a commitment to 
extended participation in the media at all levels 
by women from a variety of backgrounds.
2.   Foster critical media literacy skills 
throughout primary and secondary 
education. 
We recommend that media literacy skills be 
fostered in the education system, for instance 
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by including lessons on critical media analysis 
in the Personal Social Health and Economic 
Education (PSHE) curriculum.80 Education 
and training emerges as one key cluster of 
possible interventions to support positive shifts 
in the ways in which the media represents 
gender-related topics and their intersections 
with other in/exclusions and hierarchies in the 
longer term. The Commission sees potential, 
both in terms of children and young persons’ 
compulsory education, and professional training 
for journalists, editorial staff, and other media 
professionals.  Critical media literacy should be 
part of literacy education in schools.
3.   Include training on gendered 
representation, intersectionality 
and gender sensitive modes of 
communication. 
We recommend that gendered 
representation, intersectionality and 
gender sensitive modes of communication 
be prioritised in professional training and 
qualifications for journalists and other 
media operatives. This includes critical media 
literacy, not only in terms of how to interpret 
the media but also in terms of how to educate 
journalists. The latter would be achievable if 
accrediting bodies were mandated to do so and 
annual auditing implemented, and there was 
additional investment in training and mentoring 
programmes to further women’s leadership in 
media organisations.
4.   Implement the recommendations made in 
the Leveson report.
We recommend that the recommendations 
of the Leveson report be implemented, 
namely, by equipping the regulatory body with 
the power to act on third party complaints – 
such as complaints by representative women’s 
groups – and amending the Editors’ Code of 
Practice to reflect the interplay between freedom 
of expression/freedom of the press and existing 
equalities legislation.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Based on existing literature and on the 
evidence of specific contributions made to the 
Commission across the economy, politics, law 
and media and culture, we have been able 
to identify the depth and enduring character 
of gender-based inequalities of position and 
power. We have explored how these inequalities 
undermine existing rights, access to the law, 
fair representation in politics, realistic portrayals 
in the media and culture, and continue to pose 
difficulties for managing paid work and caring. 
These problems are differentiated among 
different groups of women and in turn reinforce 
gender inequalities and in some cases lead to 
regression from the status quo. In the Summer 
Budget of 2015, for example, the government 
continued to introduce measures which have 
disproportionately adverse impacts on women, 
BME groups and those on low incomes. Despite 
these measures, the government continues to 
resist effective impact analyses.
In this report we make a large number of 
recommendations, some of which relate to 
adjusting existing practices and procedures,  
while others require more fundamental change. 
To amend existing practices and procedures  
we recommend:
a)   monitoring to demonstrate the scale 
of inequality and impact of changes, 
b)   training to raise awareness of the 
need for gender analysis and to 
develop practices for greater equality, 
and
c)   quotas for both women and BME 
groups to effect immediate change in 
the short term. 
Other measures require more fundamental 
change and these relate to the way that existing 
knowledge and resulting institutions and practices 
are gendered. For example, there are gendered 
assumptions underlying the law and the economy. 
In the case of the economy, current understandings 
prioritise production for the market over the 
reproduction of human life. This has profound 
implications for gender inequality given the 
prevailing gender division of labour with respect to 
care and domestic work. Moreover, women’s extra 
responsibilities in terms of caring limit their presence 
in public life.  
In a time of austerity and cuts to public expenditure, 
some of these suggestions in particular may seem 
inappropriate, but as the report has shown the 
extent of public funding is a political decision and 
not a technical necessity and investment in social as 
well as physical infrastructure brings economic as 
well as social gains. 
Gender-based inequalities of position and power 
are long standing. Fifty years of policy efforts 
have secured some important changes, but 
evidence of sustained progress is lacking and 
there are marked signs of regression. Radical 
change is required to bring about progress 
towards a world of reduced gendered inequality, 
a fairer representation of women in public 
life and a fairer gender distribution of power. 
Implementing our recommendations would 
both provide a signal that there is a political will 
to make this change, and go some way toward 
rectifying this long-term social injustice. 
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